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THE  STATE  OF  THE  DEATH  PENALTY
Ankur Desai* & Brandon L. Garrett**
The death penalty is in decline in America and most death penalty states do not regularly
impose death sentences.  In 2016 and 2017, states reached modern lows in imposed death
sentences, with just thirty-one defendants sentenced to death in 2016 and thirty-nine in 2017, as
compared with over three hundred per year in the 1990s.  In 2016, only thirteen states imposed
death sentences, and in 2017, fourteen did so, although thirty-one states retain the death pen-
alty.  What explains this remarkable and quite unexpected trend?  In this Article, we present new
analysis of state-level legislative changes that might have been expected to impact death sentences.
First, life without parole (“LWOP”) statutes, now enacted in nearly every state, might have been
expected to reduce death sentences because they give jurors a noncapital option at trial.  Second,
legislatures have moved, albeit at varying paces, to comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Ring v. Arizona, which requires that the final decision in capital sentencing be made not by a
judge, but by a jury.  Third, states at different times have created statewide public defender offices
to represent capital defendants at trial.  In addition, the decline in homicides and homicide rates
could be expected to contribute to the decline in state-level death sentencing.  We find that con-
trary to the expectations of many observers, changes in the law such as adoption of LWOP and
jury sentencing, did not consistently or significantly impact death sentencing.  The decline in
homicides and homicide rates is correlated with changes in death sentencing at the state level.
However, this Article finds that state provision of capital trial representation is far more strongly
and robustly correlated with reduced death sentencing than these other factors.  The findings
bolster the argument that adequacy of counsel has greater implications for the administration of
the death penalty than other legal factors.  These findings also have implications beyond the
death penalty and they underscore the importance of a structural understanding of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in our system of criminal justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Use of capital punishment is declining in America.  Death sentencing
has fallen to a modern low and executions are increasingly rare.1  While
nineteen states have abolished the punishment, that is not a good explana-
tion for this steep decline, since none were states that had imposed death
sentences in large numbers.2  What explains this decline?  While scholars and
journalists have increasingly commented on this decline and speculated as to
1 The United States imposed fewer than one hundred death sentences and executed
fewer than fifty prisoners annually since 2011, representing the lowest yearly totals since
1976. See TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, 2013—STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl.11, 19 tbl.16 (Dec. 2014) https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf.  For data concerning death sentencing from
1990 through 2017, see Data on Death Sentencing, END OF ITS ROPE, http://endofitsrope.
com/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
2 This Article examines data from the years 1979 to 2016.  See infra Appendix A for
changes in the legality of capital punishment by state.
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what might be causing it,3 empirical research has just begun to examine the
question.4  A recent book comprehensively analyzes the great American
death penalty decline,5 and it relies on the research presented for the first
time in this Article tackling a central question: why some states have exper-
ienced greater declines in death sentences than others.
To analyze the state of the death penalty in decline, we focus on three
types of legal changes that many suspected might affect death sentencings
and focus on a defense-lawyering effect—the strong impact that the creation
of state-level capital defense offices has on reducing death sentencing.  We
conclude by discussing implications of these findings for Eighth Amendment
arbitrariness claims, Sixth Amendment right to counsel arguments, and crim-
inal justice reform conversations more broadly.
The American death penalty today produces the fewest death sentences
seen in over three decades.  In 2016, thirty-one defendants were sentenced to
death and in 2017, thirty-nine defendants were sentenced to death.6  In con-
trast, in the 1990s, several hundred people were sentenced to death each
year.  In 2016, only thirteen states imposed death sentences and in 2017,
3 See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION (2010); Richard C. Dieter, The Future of the Death Penalty in the United
States, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 921, 925 (2015); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrench-
ment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of
Capital Punishment, 30 LAW & INEQ. 211, 212, 240 (2012); Scott E. Sundby, The Death Pen-
alty’s Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1932–56 (2006); Emily Bazelon, Where the Death Penalty Still Lives, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/magazine/where-the-
death-penalty-still-lives.html; Matt Ford, The Death Penalty Becomes Rare, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-death-penalty-
becomes-unusual/390867/.
4 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN
REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017) (presenting statistical analysis of death sentencing from
1973 to 2016 and citing to the research presented here) [hereinafter GARRETT, END OF ITS
ROPE]; Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, 105 GEO.
L.J. 661 (2017) (analyzing the decline in Virginia death sentences) [hereinafter Garrett,
The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty]; Lee Kovarsky, Muscle Memory and the
Local Concentration of Capital Punishment, 66 DUKE L.J. 259 (2016) (examining county-level
concentration of death sentences); David McCord & Talia Roitberg Harmon, Lethal Rejec-
tion: An Empirical Analysis of the Astonishing Plunge in Death Sentences in the United States from
Their Post-Furman Peak, 81 ALB. L. REV. 1 (2018) (examining death sentences and capital-
eligible homicides in three years each a decade apart); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the
Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 265–75 (2012) (examining county-
level death sentencing from 2004 to 2009).
5 See GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4, at 79–105; see also Data on Death Sentenc-
ing, supra note 1 (data resource website accompanying book).  Chapter four discusses in a
summary fashion the findings presented in this Article.  This Article provides complete
findings and description of the underlying empirical research, as well as substantial new
statistical analyses.
6 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2017: YEAR END REPORT 2 (2017),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEnd2017; Death Sentences in 2016, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/2016-sentencing (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
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fourteen states did so, although thirty-one states retain the death penalty as a
legal option.  Virginia, which is third only to Texas and Oklahoma in the
number of executions in the modern era, has imposed no death sentences
since 2011.7  In the past few years, Texas has imposed only a handful of death
sentences annually.  As Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker have explained:
there are abolitionist states; but also “de facto or virtually abolitionist states,”
which retain the death penalty but rarely impose it (like Colorado); “sym-
bolic states,” which impose many death sentences but do not conduct execu-
tions (like California); and “executing states” (like Texas), which irregularly
impose death sentences and carry out executions.8  The resulting uneven
decline makes the trend in modern American death sentencing complex and
a subject in need of empirical study.
One trend that might explain that striking decline in death sentences is
the national decline in murder rates in the United States since the mid-
1990s.  We find a significant effect of the decline in homicides on death
sentences, but an effect that is highly inconsistent across states.  For example,
Texas experienced a sharp drop in capital sentencing as the number of
murders fell.9  However, murders fell even faster in California, and death
sentencing remained relatively high.10  In a separate work, we find that
declining murder rates more strongly correlate with death sentencing at the
county, rather than the state level.11  However, at that county level, other
factors, such as the race of the victims of homicide and inertia within coun-
ties, more strongly predict death sentencing.12  Although county-level prac-
tices, like the preferences of prosecutors, may strongly impact death
sentencing, changes at the state level can also be expected to affect death
sentencing.  After all, states regulate the death penalty through adoption of
legislation defining death-eligible offenses and the procedures for capital tri-
als; states maintain the death row, states conduct executions, and states may
subsidize—if not fund—the defense and prosecution of capital cases.13
In this Article, we examine three key state-law changes relating to the
death penalty that might be expected to contribute to the uneven state of the
American death penalty: (1) the enactment of life without parole (“LWOP”)
statutes for capital murder, (2) the requirement of a jury determination on
the presence of an aggravating factor, and (3) the establishment of state sys-
tems of capital representation.  Each of these types of state legal changes
7 See Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, supra note 4,
670–71.
8 CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 118 (2016).
9 See GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4, at 89.
10 Id. at 8.
11 See Brandon L. Garrett et al., The American Death Penalty Decline, 107 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 561 (2017).
12 See id.
13 See Deborah W. Denno, Courting Abolition, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1830–39 (2017)
(reviewing STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 8) (describing “uneven state practice” and state
procedures that can express “resistance or receptivity” to death sentencing).
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were ones that many observers expected to impact death sentences.  These
changes were made at different times in different states, so they could be
examined using statistical models and regressions, controlling for “fixed
effects” or other state-specific factors.
First, a possible explanation for the decline in death sentencing may be
the rise of an alternative sentence: life without parole.  Nearly every state has
introduced a life without parole sentencing option, often making noncapital
defendants and even nonmurderers eligible for true life in prison.14  LWOP
adoption has been supported by both tough-on-crime conservatives, who
sought to end parole, and death penalty abolitionists, who hoped that jurors
would prefer not to impose death if a satisfactory alternative is available.15
Many assumed that if the jury is given the choice whether to sentence a per-
son to death or LWOP, that more jurors would take advantage of a nondeath
sentence certain not to result in release.16  LWOP “provides assurance to
juries and victims’ family members that perpetrators will not be set free.”17
Second, another important possible factor is state legislation requiring
that the jury and not a judge make the decision whether to sentence a person
to death.  The Supreme Court held in its 2002 Ring v. Arizona decision that
capital sentences imposed by judges violate the defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to a trial by jury.18  Some but not all states had already adopted
such a procedure, and some states were slow to comply with this ruling,19
recently prompting the Court to reaffirm its stance.20  Some observers won-
dered whether this change might impact states where elected judges might
have incentives to aggressively impose death sentences.21
Third, reduced death sentencing may be attributed to improved repre-
sentation of capital defendants—a defense-lawyering effect.  Capital defense
in America is almost always indigent defense, and it demands far greater
14 See infra Appendix B for the year of life without parole statute enactment by state;
see also MARGARET E. LEIGEY, THE FORGOTTEN MEN: SERVING A LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SEN-
TENCE 3 (2015).
15 For a description of these political dynamics, see GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra
note 4, at 79–105.
16 See, e.g., David McCord, What’s Messing with Texas Death Sentences?, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 601, 612 (2011) (discussing speculation that LWOP might explain the Texas decline
and rejecting that explanation); see also GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4, at 79–105.
17 Dieter, supra note 3, at 925 (“Other probable reasons for the decline in the use of
the death penalty are the emergence of the alternative punishment of LWOP and the drop
in the number of murders nationwide.”).
18 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
19 See infra Appendix A, Table 3 for a complete review of state regimes at the final
stage of capital sentencing.
20 See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016).
21 See Daren S. Koudele, Comment, Unraveling Ring v. Arizona: Balancing Judicial Sen-
tencing Enhancements with the Sixth Amendment in Capital Punishment Schemes, 106 W. VA. L.
REV. 843, 845–46 (2004) (arguing that “strong consideration” in explaining the decline in
death sentences should be given to Ring v. Arizona and also Atkins v. Virginia).
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knowledge, skill, and effort on the part of an attorney.22  Since 1932, the
Supreme Court has required a court-appointed lawyer for any indigent
defendant charged with a capital crime,23 and the Court has affirmed that
the Sixth Amendment requires some minimal level of investigation of miti-
gating evidence that might provide the jury with a reason not to sentence a
person to death.24  But achieving widespread competent defense is an “enor-
mous social task,”25 as Anthony Lewis observed in the wake of Gideon v. Wain-
wright.26  Claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel have long been
the most common reason why death sentences are reversed during postcon-
viction proceedings.  The American Bar Association has documented inade-
quate resources for capital defense in death penalty states, and it has
highlighted the need for a “responsible agency” to ensure statewide quality in
capital representation.27  Some states created such offices; they are more
effective and they can also be less expensive than appointed lawyers on a
case-by-case basis.  Other states have not done so, although more states have
done so over time.28  In this Article, we find that legislation creating state
offices for capital defense has strongly and robustly contributed to the reduc-
tion in death sentencing.  States like Virginia and North Carolina that cre-
ated such offices experienced steeper declines in death sentencing once they
did so.  States like California and Florida that continue to rely largely on
court-appointed lawyers in capital trials have maintained death sentencing at
a comparatively higher rate.
22 See About Us, OFFICE ST. PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.ospd.ca.gov/about-us/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2016).  California made one of the first major efforts to organize a state-level
capital defender by legislation that transitioned the Office of the State Public Defender
into a specialized capital defense office, primarily in recognition of the disproportionate
appellate caseload precipitated by a growing death row population. Id.
23 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72–73 (1932).
24 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005) (requiring reasonable investi-
gation even when no mitigating evidence believed to exist); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
534 (2003) (mandating reasonable investigation as an element of effective assistance of
counsel); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (reversing unsuccessful capital
appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel).
25 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET: HOW ONE MAN, A POOR PRISONER, TOOK HIS
CASE TO THE SUPREME COURT—AND CHANGED THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 215 (1964)
(describing intense state commitment required to pursue “the dream of a vast, diverse
country in which every man charged with crime will be capably defended, no matter what
his economic circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing him will do so
proudly”).
26 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (requiring effective assistance of counsel for all indigent
criminal defendants).
27 AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYS-
TEMS: THE ALABAMA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT, at iii, xiii (2006), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/ala
bama/report.authcheckdam.pdf.
28 See GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4, at 111–12.
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Call it a “defense-lawyering effect.”29  We find that this defense-lawyering
effect of creating state-level capital trial offices was more than twice as strong
as the effect of adopting LWOP.  Our empirical modeling shows that the
introduction of LWOP sentencing is associated with fewer capital sentences,
but that the extent of reduced sentencing is small.  We found that the
defense-lawyering effect was a much more consistent effect than any state-
wide effect of murder rates.  We found that compliance with Ring v. Arizona,
the Supreme Court decision that requires a jury decision at sentencing in a
death penalty case,30 showed erratic coefficients, suggesting the impact was
not statistically sound (and further analysis showed that a few states
accounted for any apparent effect).31  In sum, changes in state law did not
consistently impact state-level death sentencing.  Changes in resources for
defense lawyering did.
These results help to explain the remarkable trend in the imposition of
the ultimate punishment over the past two decades: the American death pen-
alty decline.  These results also suggest the both practical and constitutional
implications of the decline.  Both scholarly and judicial opinions have dif-
fered in the past as to the implications of the decline in capital punishment.
In his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross in 2014, Justice Stephen Breyer
concluded the death penalty may now be unconstitutional, noting “dramatic
declines” in death sentences even in states like Texas and Virginia.32  Justice
Antonin Scalia countered in a concurring opinion that fewer death sentences
show the system is working and the Court has been wrong to support
“proliferation of labyrinthine restrictions on capital punishment.33
We suggest that both perspectives are missing an important part of the
story.  The decline does have to do with the system working better, but not
the system that Justice Scalia had in mind.  The Supreme Court’s rules on
capital punishment, while modestly requiring some minimal effort dedicated
to investigating mitigation evidence in death penalty trials, has never
required that there be any minimal amount of resources for death penalty
cases.  The Court has never suggested that states need to create offices to
handle capital cases (while the America Bar Association has, the Court has
never explicitly ratified that recommendation).  The defense-lawyering effect
does not come from the Supreme Court, but from state-level innovations.
We describe how the emergence of team-defense strategies in capital trial
offices may have improved the effectiveness of those offices, even given lim-
ited resources.
That these changes may have played an outsized role in the death pen-
alty decline suggest that indigent defense plays an underappreciated role in
criminal justice more generally.  Indigent defense resources are lacking in
many states, where the situation has long been dire.  If cases outside of capi-
29 Id.
30 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
31 For further discussion of these findings, see infra Part II.
32 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2775 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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tal cases obtained team-defense resources to hire social workers and conduct
better factual investigations, the results could have a dramatic impact on the
quality and fairness of criminal justice.  These findings could influence
lawmakers considering indigent defense budgeting, although the lack of
budgeting has been endemic.  These findings also suggest that courts should
do far more to attend to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel issues raised
in death penalty cases as well as in noncapital cases.  If the system was work-
ing and all death penalty cases received minimally adequate counsel, we
might see a far steeper decline in death sentencing in this country—and per-
haps in criminal punishment more broadly.
In Part I, we explore how the statistical understanding of the death pen-
alty has changed, describe studies that have examined state-level effects on
death sentencing, and present a new model of the death penalty decline.
Part II evaluates the impact of each type of state legislation in detail.  In Part
III, we discuss the implications of the empirical findings.  The powerful role
of state-level representation in reduced sentencing supports a continued
emphasis on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in capital trials and
invites litigators challenging the death penalty to take advantage of tech-
niques developed by capital defenders.  Finally, to the extent that doctrine,
federalism-based, and practical concerns preclude the Supreme Court from
actively promoting state provision of capital defense under existing Sixth
Amendment doctrine, this Article argues that remarkable gains in the fair-
ness and effectiveness of capital punishment could result from state policy
reform.
I. STATE DEATH SENTENCING PATTERNS
A. Prior Research on State Death Sentencing
There is a substantial body of empirical work studying death sentencing,
and for several decades, scholars have studied both state and local death sen-
tencing patterns.  The American death penalty has always been dominated by
the practices of the most active death sentencing jurisdictions.  Figure 1
shows how three states, California, Florida, and Texas, play an outsized role
(and constitute a growing share) of death sentencing.
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FIGURE 1:  CAPITAL SENTENCING NATIONALLY, 1979–2013,
SEGMENTED BY STATE
Many of the classic studies of death sentencing have focused on single
states.  For example, the study of death sentencing in Georgia from 1974
through 1979, led by David C. Baldus, examined factors influencing death
sentencing, and found that race discrimination played a substantial role.34
Over time, researchers studied sentencing patterns in groups of death pen-
alty states and then the sentencing patterns across all death penalty states.35
The “Broken System” studies led by James Liebman, Valerie West, and Jeffrey
Fagan examined death sentences from 1973 through the early 1990s.36  That
work focused on state-level practices affecting death sentencing, including
reversal rates by state appellate and postconviction courts, but also county-
level patterns in death sentencing.37  That research has been updated.  A
study by Robert J. Smith of death sentences between 2004 and 2009 found
increased “clustering around a narrow band of counties.”38  In a prior pro-
ject, these authors, along with Alexander Jakubow, studied county-level death
34 DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 268 n.31 (1990).
35 Id.  For subsequent research, see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH
PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990); Cathe-
rine M. Grosso et al., Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Over-
view, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 525, 525 (James R. Acker et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2014).
36 James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Pen-
alty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 299 (2011); James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System:
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Work-
ing Paper Grp., Paper No. 15, 2000), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=232712.
37 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 36, at 264; see also Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken
System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 209, 247 (2004).
38 Smith, supra note 4, at 228.
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sentencing from 1990 to 2015, and examined correlations between death
sentencing and murder rates, race of victim, past death sentencing, and
county demographics.39
Several studies have examined some, although not all, of the state-level
factors that we focus on in this Article.  Two studies have used empirical tech-
niques to examine individual legislative changes of the type that we study in
this Article.  One study, focusing just on Delaware, found that increased
death sentencing in that state might be attributable to the judge’s ability to
impose death sentences (and not the jury).40  A second piece, a student note,
suggested that life without parole statutes do not reduce death sentencing.41
In addition, prior work has examined the connection between murder rates
and death sentencing.  Researchers have found that there were strong corre-
lations between the number of murders, murder rates, and death sentences
in a state, at least during the earlier time period during which death
sentences were increasing each year.42  This Article looks at death sentencing
from the entire United States over thirty-seven years, from 1979 to 2016,
which includes the time period in which death sentencing steadily rose and
the period in which death sentencing began to fall, and it looks at a larger set
of state-level factors.
B. Data Sources
This Article incorporates data collected from government records con-
cerning homicide, state legislative history, and death row populations, as well
as data that we coded on state legislation and indigent capital defense
resources.  The data examined includes: (1) death sentencing data; (2)
homicide data; (3) life without parole adoption; (4) judge versus jury capital
sentencing; and (5) state-level capital defense regimes.  This Section
describes each data source in turn.
1. Death Sentencing Data
The primary dependent variable in the analysis is the number of death
sentences in a given year in a given state, in the years 1979 through 2015.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) maintains data on the number of indi-
viduals sentenced to death each year in the United States.43  These reports
39 See Garrett et al., supra note 11.
40 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97
IOWA L. REV. 1925, 1954 (2012).
41 Note, A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital
Punishment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2006).
42 See John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD 165, 174 (2004) (finding strong correlation between homicide and
capital sentencing); Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An
Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 347 (2005) (“The number of murders in a state
largely determines the size of a state’s death row.”).
43 Publications & Products: Capital Punishment, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=1 (last visited Dec. 9, 2014).
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have been widely used in studies of the death penalty44 and are considered
the most accurate and comprehensive.45
2. Homicide Data
Second, we examine state-level homicide data from 1979 through 2015.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) mortality data, or
the CDC WONDER database, is produced from mandatory submissions of
death certificates to the National Vital Statistics System,46 provides the most
complete and reliable data on violent crime and homicide.47  As a prominent
source of public data on national health and mortality, the CDC also imposes
confidentiality restrictions; where fewer than ten homicides occur in a
county, entries are redacted.48  Where multiple years’ redaction makes
reconstruction of CDC figures not possible, data is supplemented by the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program (“UCR”) data on homicides.49
Comparison of these databases indicates that the UCR homicide data con-
tains around eighty percent of murders reported by the CDC, and analysis
shows neither geographical nor temporal bias in the differences between
CDC and FBI figures.50
44 See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 42, at 168; Johnson et al., supra note 40, at 1932–35;
Liebman & Clarke, supra note 36, at 330 n.379, 337 n.41.  In addition, the BJS data is
altered from year to year, as BJS learns of additional information and revises its data. Com-
pare TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT, 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.16 (last updated Nov. 2014), with SNELL, supra note
1 (revising earlier data to state that 311 persons were sentenced to death in 1994, as com-
pared with 315 in the earlier report).  For more discussion, see McCord & Harmon, supra
note 4, at 2 & n.3.
45 See Blume et al., supra note 42, at 169 n.15 (describing discrepancies in the BJS data
as “minimal”).
46 Compressed Mortality File: Years 1968–1978 with ICD-8 Codes, 1979–1998 with IDC-9
Codes and 1999–2016 with ICD-10 Codes, CDC WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/
help/cmf.html, [hereinafter Compressed Mortality File] (last updated July 20, 2018).
47 The WONDER database includes indicators for observations where a low volume of
homicide results in statistically crude estimates; these cautionary indicators provide helpful
guidance in fashioning approaches to statistical analysis.  Homicide rates, for example, can
generally be used as a variable in modeling, as states with exceptionally low yearly murder
figures tend to have abolished the death penalty in any case.  Use of capital sentencing
rates as a dependent variable, by contrast, makes small states like Delaware and Wyoming
appear to be hundreds or thousands of times more important than Alabama or Texas, so
the choice is best approached with caution.
48 See Compressed Mortality File, supra note 46.
49 Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
word (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
50 Since data are supplemented primarily in small states that do not engage in the
death penalty, disparities between sources of homicide data in this study have minimal
impact.  See infra Appendix B for a detailed comparison of homicide reporting by the FBI
and the CDC.
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3. LWOP
During the time period from 1979 through 2015, we coded whether
each state had an LWOP statute in effect.51  We coded in which year each
statute was adopted.52  We sought to assess whether the availability of this
alternative to the death penalty encouraged jurors to consider that sentenc-
ing option more often.  We note, however, that in some states, judges were
slow to instruct jurors on the availability of LWOP as an option, resulting in
still additional litigation concerning the issue and a delay in any trial-level
impact of LWOP adoption.
4. Judge Versus Jury Sentencing
We examined whether states had jury or judge sentencing in the years
from 1979 through 2015.53  In 2002, the Supreme Court’s Ring v. Arizona
decision required states to mandate a jury decision on the presence of an
aggravating factor.  Several states, however, did not immediately comply with
the ruling, as Appendix A illustrates.54  Florida, for example, did not comply
until after 2016, when the Supreme Court struck down its statute in Hurst v.
Florida.55  In 2016, the Delaware Supreme Court found its death penalty stat-
ute unconstitutional following the ruling in Hurst.56
5. Capital Defense Regimes
Finally, we collected data on whether states had state-level public defense
offices to represent defendants in capital trials.  In the 1970s and 1980s, most
states that had the death penalty did not provide state-level offices to handle
the defense in death penalty cases.  Six states did so, and most were states like
Connecticut that had few death sentences.  Figure 2 illustrates capital
defense resources by state in 1979.
51 In each year that a state legislature has made the sentencing option available for
murder, this variable is recorded as a zero (0).  In years when no LWOP option was availa-
ble, the variable holds value one (1).
52 See infra Appendix A for a complete table of life without parole statute enactment
years.
53 This variable is recorded as zero (0) when a state’s final decisionmaker in capital
sentencing is a jury; when states fail to comply with Ring and the final decisionmaker is a
judge, the variable is recorded as one (1).
54 See also infra Section II.C for discussion of variations in the informal and legal
standards imposed within some states.
55 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
56 See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam).
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FIGURE 2:  CAPITAL DEFENSE RESOURCES BY STATE, 1979
This began to change in the 1990s, when nine states had created such
offices (including, for example, Missouri, Arkansas, and Tennessee), and
more states provided some limited assistance at trial, even if not a lawyer
from a state office.  By 2015, almost all death penalty states provided state-
level capital representation at trial, although as Figure 3 below illustrates,
leading death penalty states, like Alabama and Florida, still do not have any
trial resources at the state level for capital defense, and other key states, like
Texas, do so only in what we code as limited resources.57
FIGURE 3:  CAPITAL DEFENSE RESOURCES BY STATE, 2015
This change was gradual, as it was not required by any Supreme Court
decision or other legal obligation.  Indeed, some states created these public
defender offices not just to improve the quality of representation in capital
cases and address potential constitutional concerns, but also as a cost-saving
measure.  In addition to coding whether states had a statewide office to pro-
vide capital representation, we also coded states that have implemented lim-
ited or partial measures, beyond simply stating guidelines for qualified
57 We discuss these categories in more detail in the next part, but our criteria for
including a state in the “limited” category are presence of two or more of the following: the
state (i) provides trial-level funding in major dense regions or urban centers; (ii) mandates
a significant hourly wage for capital defenders; (iii) provides statewide training resources
for capital trial lawyers; or (iv) that counties have an arrangement for pooled capital
defense resources.  Appendix A, Table 5 details the coding regarding state-level capital
defense.
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defense attorneys.58  We also use a simplified classification, which credits
only states that clearly provide state-level representation to all capital
defendants.
C. Empirical Strategy
To understand why death sentencing has declined far beyond levels pre-
dicted by trends in homicide, the effects of three state-level changes on capi-
tal sentencing—LWOP sentencing, jury sentencing, and state-level capital
defense—are compared across several statistical models.  First, traditional lin-
ear modeling provides a baseline for our examination of the impact of each
legislative measure studied.  The basic linear model is represented by the
function:
Capital Sentences = Homicides + [Life without parole sentencing unavailable] +
[No state-level capital defense provided] + [Judge authority in final
sentencing phase]
That linear regression model, however, cannot capture the variability in
characteristics of states, such as size and type of legal regimes.  For that rea-
son, we also conduct a fixed-effects regression model.  The data we examine
over time is panel data and segmented by state.  We examine state fixed
effects to control for any unobserved features that affect death sentencing at
the state level.  For example, the fixed effects model adjusts for the basic
disparity between a state like Delaware, which despite its small size has
imposed up to six death sentences in a single year, and Texas, which has
imposed over twenty-five annual death sentences on average.59
Third, we conduct a mixed-effects regression, which controls for both
effects between states but also intrastate effects.  Even nationally imposed
decisions like Ring v. Arizona create effects that differ across the country,60
justifying the use of both fixed- and random-effect modeling.  Both fixed-
and random-effects panel models also achieve a relatively high degree of
fit.61  This model can help to control for broader factors that may spill across
58 See infra Appendix A, Table 5 (providing complete commentary on the coding deci-
sions related to this variable).  In states where capital representation is effectively provided
by state attorneys specializing in capital defense, this variable is recorded as 0.  In states
that have implemented limited or partial measures to fund and set guidelines for represen-
tation in capital trials, the variable is recorded as 0.5.  States may also be classified in this
“limited” provision category where state attorneys represent clients only in certain coun-
ties.  States are awarded a value of 1 for years in which there is no state-level capacity to
represent defendants in capital trials, and court-appointed lawyers or local public defend-
ers defend such trials.
59 Delaware imposed six death sentences in 1993. See supra note 43.
60 The Supreme Court’s decision in Ring compelled Arizona to change procedure.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Responses by other states must be treated individu-
ally.  The factors driving state decisions on whether to comply with the Ring holding are
explored in Section II.C.
61 Fixed-effects and mixed-effects models achieve a multiple R-squared value of
approximately 0.791.  Throughout the analysis, the apparent difference between fixed-
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state lines, such as national trends in public opinion, nationally imposed
Supreme Court rulings, regional crime levels, and regional prosecution
practices.
Fourth, we conducted a Poisson regression (as well as a negative bino-
mial regression), which is useful to deemphasize very small and very large
samples.  Death sentencing is heavily concentrated in states like California,
Florida, and Texas, and the Poisson regression focuses on the more midlevel
states in the sample.  This nonlinear model provides helpful clarity when
modeling tightly packed dependent variables, such as capital sentencing
rates.  Any variable-specific modeling decisions are discussed in the relevant
sections below.62
Additional combinations of each statistical technique are made possible
by variables that account for lag times in prosecution, measuring homicide in
total volume or as a proportion of population, and other modeling choices.
These choices are discussed further in Section II.B, and selected additional
tables are provided in Appendix C.
II. FINDINGS: EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN DEATH SENTENCING
In this Part, we describe the findings regarding the impact on death sen-
tencing based upon four types of state-level changes: the decline in homi-
cides and homicide rates; and three legal changes, (1) the enactment of
LWOP statutes at the state level; (2) the requirement a jury determination at
the final sentencing phase in compliance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Ring v. Arizona; and (3) the establishment of state systems of indigent capital
defense representation.  We found that the decline in homicides and homi-
cide rates did not fully explain the decline in death sentences.  Something
else must be at work.  We then ruled out two legal changes.  We conclude in
this Part that state provision of capital defense is the measure most strongly
and robustly correlated with a decline in actual death sentences.  In contrast
to the effects observed regarding LWOP and jury sentencing, the “defense-
lawyering effect” was robust and consistently strong across models.  In Part
III, we turn to the implications of this finding for the future of death penalty
and criminal justice practice.
effects and mixed-effects models is small.  Erring on the side of caution, this Article follows
the advice of Gelman and Hill to “always use multilevel modeling.” ANDREW GELMAN &
JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS
246 (2007).
62 For example, the abolition of the death penalty in many states during this period of
analysis allows for two general approaches: One option is the creation of a dummy variable
that holds the numeric value of homicides where the death penalty is available, and holds 0
where it is not.  A simpler approach is merely to exclude observations from years when the
death penalty is unavailable.  Either approach yields the same interpretive conclusions;
results are displayed in terms of the latter approach.
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A. Overview of Findings
Table 1 displayed below summarizes the main findings of our analysis,
using a simple model which omits abolitionist states in years in which a given
state did not have the death penalty legally available.  The table compares the
regression results, using each of the four models described in Part I, examin-
ing the role played by the introduction of life without parole sentencing,
judge versus jury sentencing, creation of state-level indigent defense for capi-
tal cases, and total numbers of homicides, in four models.
TABLE 1:  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF STATE DEATH SENTENCING AND HOMICIDE
TOTALS, 1979–2015
 Ordinary 
least 
squares 
(linear) 
regression
Panel model 
controlling 
for fixed 
effects 
within states
“Mixed 
effects” 
model 
controlling 
for both 
fixed and 
random 
effects 
Poisson 
regression 
model 
Negative 
binomial 
model 
No state-
level capital 
defense 
provided 
3.333* 
(1.77) 
4.005** 
(0.49) 
4.033** 
(0.47) 
1.089** 
(0.04) 
0.992** 
(0.08) 
Jury not 
fully 
informed of 
life without 
parole 
sentencing 
0.693 
(1.76) 
1.674** 
(0.33) 
1.568** 
(0.31) 
0.349** 
(0.03) 
0.176* 
(0.06) 
Judge 
authority in 
final 
sentencing 
phase 
3.288 
(1.71) 
0.439 
(0.53) 
0.713* 
(0.50) 
0.395** 
(0.03) 
0.335** 
(0.07) 
Note: * Indicates significance at 0.1 level.  ** Indicates significance at 0.001 level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Modeling shows that LWOP statutes are associated with reduced sen-
tencing but with a small effects size, when controlling for total homicides in
each state.  The provision of state-level capital defense exhibits correlation
with a decline in sentencing that is both strong and robust.  Compliance with
Ring v. Arizona, by mandating a jury decision at the final phase of sentencing,
exhibits weak correlation and a high probability threshold at which the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, suggesting the impact of this measure on
death sentencing is not statistically sound; further analysis described below
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indicates that a small number of states disproportionately contribute to the
effects observed.63  The Sections that follow explain these finding in more
detail.
B. Homicide and Capital Sentencing
We sought to explore whether the decline in death sentencing is attribu-
table simply to the national decline in homicides, which has affected each of
the death penalty states, and which began in the mid-1990s, not long before
death sentencing similarly began to fall.  Studies in the past have found a
close relationship between capital sentencing and homicide rates, suggesting
that at least in some death penalty states, a stable percentage of homicide
prosecutions reliably resulted in the death penalty.64  However, we observe
that homicides and death sentences have become increasingly decoupled.  As
shown at a national level in Figure 4, the United States imposed eight capital
sentences per thousand murders in the years following Supreme Court rein-
statement of the death penalty.  By 1999, this figure had climbed to sixteen
death sentences per thousand murders.  Between 2000 and 2011, however,
the capital sentencing rate fell to fewer than five sentences per thousand
murders.  The reduction in homicides since 2000 has been steady, and it has
resulted in a decline of ten percent.65  In the same period, however, capital
sentencing has fallen by more than sixty percent.
63 See infra Section II.E for further argument that Ring compliance shows no clear
effect on sentencing.
64 See, e.g., Blume et al. supra note 42, at 174 (finding strong correlation between
homicide and capital sentencing); Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 347 (“The number of
murders in a state largely determines the size of a state’s death row.”); Stephen F. Smith,
Has the “Machinery of Death” Become a Clunker?, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 860 (2015) (arguing
that “[t]he strongest alternative explanation for recent declines in the death penalty
involves crime rates”). But see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 212 (attributing declines
in death sentencing in part to noncrime factors, including changing legal regimes sur-
rounding the penalty).  Recent trends force reconsideration of the role of homicide as a
predictive variable.
65 See infra Appendix B, Figure 7 (illustrating CDC and FBI measures of homicide).
CDC figures indicate a decline from 16,765 homicides in 2000, to 16,241 in 2011, a reduc-
tion of around three percent.  Estimates by reporting agencies vary.
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FIGURE 4:  RATIO OF CAPITAL SENTENCES TO HOMICIDES NATIONALLY,
1979–2015
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Examined at a state level, one can see how the decline in homicides
affected the top death sentencing states, but not in equally dramatic fashion.
Figure 5 illustrates the trends in homicide among the top five states, ranked
by imposition of death sentences.  These five states account for nearly half of
all national death sentencing since 1980.
FIGURE 5:  HOMICIDES IN MAJOR DEATH PENALTY STATES, 1979–2012
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Among these states, Figure 5 suggests that changes in homicide are not
producing uniform effects on the death penalty.  Florida and Alabama have
both seen a relatively gradual reduction in murders.  Meanwhile, California
enjoyed the greatest drop in homicides in the country.  Yet each state contin-
ues sentencing criminals to death regularly—indeed, these three states alone
have contributed more than half of the nation’s recent death sentences.66
Complicating any relationship between homicides and death sentences, not
all murders are death eligible, so one would not expect changes in murder
rates to necessarily correspond to changes in death sentencing patterns.  In
many states, however, the death-eligibility criteria include quite vague stan-
dards67 that can potentially sweep in many or even most murders.68
Homicide measures also play a key role in further statistical analysis.  We
employed a number of models for the analysis underlying this Article.69  In
county-level research on death sentencing, for example, one important analy-
sis was to examine whether homicide rates are more closely related to death
sentencing when one lags homicide rates by one year.70  That is because it
66 In 2013, California, Florida, and Alabama contributed forty-five capital sentences to
a total of eighty-one, nationally.  California alone imposed twenty-five capital sentences.
See SNELL, supra note 1, at 9 tbl.4.
67 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (West 2018) (“[C]onduct in committing the
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.”).
68 See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share and the
Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1821 (2006) (finding national
death eligibility rate of twenty-five percent based on FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports
data and slightly lower twenty-one percent Texas rate); Justin Marceau et al., Death Eligibil-
ity in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1107 (2013)
(studying Colorado homicides from 1999 to 2010 and finding ninety percent death eligi-
ble); see also Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of
the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978–1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. ON RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
1, 18 (2004) (finding twenty-one percent death-eligibility rate in Maryland); Steven F.
Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1283, 1332 (1997) (finding eighty-four percent death eligibility rate in California).
69 Briefly summarized, we analyzed thirty-seven years of capital sentencing and state
legislative history data in the following variations: lagging murders as against LWOP adop-
tion; lagging murders against each independent variable (Appendix C, Tables 6 & 7);
including a time gap between each independent variable and capital sentencing figures;
measuring actual homicide figures as well as homicide rates (Appendix C, Table 8); and
including a dummy variable to represent abolitionist states, creating an overdispersed
dataset to which we applied negative binomial regressions (Appendix C, Table 10).
Although space limitations prevent us from presenting each combination, a selection of
models is presented in the Appendix, illustrating the robust and high correlation coeffi-
cients associated with state-level capital sentencing at strong confidence intervals.  Allocat-
ing sentencing authority to a judge or jury has lower correlation coefficients in the panel
models, and uniformly low significance.  We also observe a lack of significance for life
without parole adoption in key models, including those using lagged homicide rates
(Appendix C, Table 8) and the negative binomial model (Appendix C, Table 10).
70 See Garrett et al., supra note 11, at 597–99 (analyzing lagged county-level homicide
data).
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can take time for a case to proceed to a trial.  By contrast, an unlagged model
reflects the view that decisionmakers in the capital sentencing process are
acutely aware of contemporary murder figures and base their decisions in
part on that awareness.  (This is almost certainly true of some prosecutors,
and may to a lesser degree be true of judges, who exert substantial influence
even in the majority of states where they lack formal death sentencing
authority, and of juries.)  The contrasting viewpoints also inform whether to
measure homicide rates against state populations, or against national
trends.71  Across models, we consistently find that state-level capital defense is
strongly correlated with sentencing.  Results are presented using a model
that associates homicides figures with the actual capital sentences in the same
year, and additional models are presented in Appendix C.
C. State Adoption of Life Without Parole
Many observers of the modern American death penalty decline have
speculated that state adoption of LWOP might explain the drop in death
sentencing.  However, we found that state adoption of life without parole
reduces death sentencing inconsistently across models, and the extent of
change is small where it is observed.  This Section describes the results of
regression modeling and, by exploring the history of parole and the develop-
ment of true life imprisonment options, describes why there might be this
observed weak effect of life without parole sentencing on death sentencing.
The statistical significance of the relationship between LWOP sentenc-
ing options and capital punishment is supported by two key indicators.  The
models exhibit moderate standard error values; furthermore, the Poisson
model and both panel models reject the null hypothesis at a very small 0.001
level.  The estimated impact of LWOP introduction is small; introducing life
without parole reduces capital sentencing between fifty percent and seventy
percent less effectively than the provision of state-level capital defense.  The
Poisson regression model suggests a far smaller comparative effect of LWOP
sentencing, suggesting that the observed effects largely come from either very
small or large jurisdictions.  By its nature, the Poisson model amplifies the
effect of moderately sized states, and examination of individual states bears
out this pattern.  Negative binomial regression results further highlight the
71 Contributors have also suggested incorporating a multiyear lag, on the logic that
decisionmakers react to longer term trends rather than instant figures in murder rates.
Our analysis expresses no preference between models; as we observe the same results from
each, results are presented using the models that display the greatest degree of overall fit.
While the ground-level fact that capital murders take significant time to prosecute is com-
pelling, other scholars have cast doubt on the view that some portion of murderers will
inevitably face capital trial.  The often vague standards for capital eligibility, as observed
above, see supra note 67, have inspired the comment that “virtually any murder case is a
death-eligible case with a little creativity on the part of the prosecutor.” Race and the Death
Penalty (C-SPAN television broadcast Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.c-span.org/video/
?197237-1/race-death-penalty (statement of Stephen B. Bright).
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lack of any consistent connection between LWOP adoption and death
sentencing.
The enactment of LWOP statutes is most strongly associated with
reduced sentencing in three states with large death row populations: Florida,
Ohio, and Oklahoma.  By contrast, Missouri and Louisiana, states that
engage in capital punishment more moderately, exhibit the lowest overall
effects of LWOP on death sentencing.72  Or take Texas: Texas adopted life
without parole quite late, in fall 2005, and death sentencing had already
begun to decline at that time, and it continued to do so largely to the same
degree after LWOP was adopted.73  Or contrast Virginia, where death
sentences went up for almost ten years after life without parole was adopted
in 1995 (death sentences did not begin to fall in Virginia until 2004, after
which, regional capital defense offices were established).74
The weak relationship between life without parole and actual death sen-
tencing that we have found will certainly surprise many observers.  In particu-
lar, public opinion polling has suggested that the new sentencing option
could dramatically alter the death penalty landscape.  The public has long
been divided on whether the death penalty is appropriate for murder, but
when opinion surveys include LWOP as an alternative, public support for the
death penalty is much lower.75  Jury research suggests that jurors in capital
cases are significantly influenced by the potential that a convicted defendant
could ultimately be released on parole.76  That said, the “death qualification”
procedure for jury candidates, in which judges may screen potential jurors
for adverse views on the death penalty, makes public opinion an imperfect
proxy for the views of jurors in actual capital cases.77  Moreover, some key
states, like Florida, did not have jury sentencing for many years after adopt-
ing LWOP.
In addition, many states have not required that jurors receive clear
instructions concerning LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty.  While
the Supreme Court in Simmons v. South Carolina ruled in 1994 that the jury
must be instructed on the lack of parole availability in a case in which future
72 See GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4, at 98–99.
73 See id. at 99.
74 See id.
75 See Richard C. Dieter, Sentencing for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 1993), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentenc
ing-life-americans-embrace-alternatives-death-penalty (reporting that “the sentence of life
without parole plus restitution causes a support drop of 36% [for the death penalty]”).
76 See William W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of “Life” for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect
on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1624–25 (1989); see also Note, supra
note 41, at 1838 (“The existence of parole has certainly led more juries to sentence defend-
ants to death.”).
77 See Smith, supra note 64, at 862 n.100 (“The key point here is to distinguish between
voters and capital jurors.  Among voters, support for the death penalty is greatly reduced, if
not overtaken by the opposing view, when LWOP is available.”); see also Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (holding the practice of “death qualification” to be
constitutional).
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dangerousness is put before the jury, otherwise the Court has not compelled
that jurors be informed of the LWOP option.78  Many death penalty states by
statute or in state court rulings have required that jurors be informed of the
LWOP option.79  Other death penalty states did not or were slow to do so,
which could predictably blunt any effect at trial (although perhaps not in
plea bargaining) of LWOP being formally on the books.80  The decline in
death sentencing in states like Pennsylvania, in which jurors are still not,
except when required by Simmons, required to be informed of the LWOP
option, cannot be attributed to LWOP’s influence on trial jurors.81  Account-
ing for this subtle procedural difference in implementation between states,
and properly measuring the year in which LWOP could plausibly influence
sentencing behavior, yielded a model with stronger correlation significance
and better fit.82  The small effect of LWOP on sentencing can, in part, be
attributed to the fact that key death penalty states still do not fully instruct
jurors on the nature or availability of a noncapital life without parole sentenc-
ing option.
The history of the adoption of LWOP reflects its ambiguous role in our
statistical findings.  Parole was introduced in 1913, and in the decades that
followed, life in prison was largely a symbolic phrase, and life sentences were
78 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
79 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b) (West 2018); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-2515(7) (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.030(4) (West 2018).
80 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2018) (legislation requiring jury instruction that
life imprisonment means without parole); State v. Shafer, 573 S.E.2d 796 (S.C. 2002) (rely-
ing on statute requiring that jurors be informed of LWOP option enacted seven years after
initial LWOP adoption); Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999) (requir-
ing that jurors be informed of LWOP option four years after statutory adoption).
81 See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 78–79 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v.
May, 710 A.2d 44, 47 (Pa. 1998).
82 Where states made statutory changes requiring jurors to be informed of an LWOP
option, a one-year lag was introduced to account for the time needed for such changes to
take effect.  See Appendix C, Table 6 for corresponding results that take LWOP enactment
at face value, without accounting for whether juries are actually informed of the option.  In
statistical terms, the impact of enactment is similarly affected by LWOP statutes that apply
only to new offenses, not in proceedings to resentence offenders convicted prior to the
LWOP statute. See, e.g., H.B. 27, 1994 Gen. Assemb., 7th Extra Sess. (N.C. 1994) (“Section
6 of this act becomes effective on the date that G.S. 15A–1340.16 becomes effective and
applies to offenses committed on or after that date.  The remainder of this act becomes
effective May 1, 1994.  Sections 1, 2, 4, and 5 of this act apply to offenses committed on or
after that date.  Section 3 of this act applies to trials begun on or after that date.”).  See also
Appendix C, Table 8 for results based on a metric removing resentences in years when
juries were being instructed on LWOP; that is, accounting for the hypothesis that LWOP
effects are not accurately being measured because the option was unavailable for inmates
who had previously been sentenced under the old rules.  The resulting model continues to
show a far stronger capital defense effect, but a greater impact from LWOP enactment and
better overall fit.
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often less than twenty years long.83  Rehabilitation, a long-debated premise of
criminal justice in America, had become an entrenched value of the prison
system.84  However, during the 1970s, lawmakers began to reject rehabilita-
tion as an important goal in criminal justice.  In many states, LWOP was
adopted as part of a “truth-in-sentencing” and a tough-on-crime push to end
parole.85  Opponents of the death penalty, meanwhile, had supported adop-
tion of LWOP because they believed it would reduce death sentencing and
provide an alternative to death.86  Proponents of the death penalty have
argued that LWOP adoption would harm the use of the death penalty and
prosecutors have in the past opposed LWOP in some states, such as Texas.87
In addition, policymakers and scholars have debated the relative cruelty of
the death penalty and true life in prison.88
Empirical correlation shows a low impact of LWOP-statute enactment on
capital punishment, as described, but there is a perverse nondeath penalty
story to tell here.  As state legislatures exposed a wider range of criminals to
this new sentencing option, LWOP sentences have exploded, sweeping in
many types of cases that would not be death eligible.89  With over 50,000
inmates serving life without parole sentences, and 160,000 prisoners serving
life sentences, almost one in nine prisoners is serving a life sentence.90  The
growth sparks important normative and moral questions about the rise of
83 See Note, supra note 41, at 1839–44 (detailing the complicated history of the parole
system in America).  Due to increasingly violent conditions and the natural effects of incar-
ceration, long prison terms do frequently result in death prior to parole release.
84 See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION (1989) for history of the death penalty in
America from 1776 to 1865.
85 Public belief in exaggerated effects of the parole system has been the historical
norm. See Note, supra note 41, at 1840, 1842 (observing that effective prison sentences in
states that adopted parole have paradoxically grown longer rather than shorter in the past
century).
86 See id. at 1838–39; see also LEIGEY, supra note 14, at 3–9 (elaborating the abolitionist
justifications for introducing life without parole sentencing).
87 See Note, supra note 41, at 1843.
88 See MASUR, supra note 84, at 146 (describing debates in the 1830s on the fundamen-
tal tension between the true cruelty of death and life in prison).  In their earliest formula-
tion, these debates focused on the implications of solitary confinement.  Isolation
continues to be an increasingly prevalent tactic in American prisons. See Jeffrey L. Metzner
& Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical
Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 107 (2010).  In most state prison systems,
inmates sentenced to life without parole are subject to solitary confinement on the basis of
misconduct.
89 See MARC MAUER ET AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF “LIFE”: LONG PRISON
SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 33 (2004), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/The-Meaning-of-Life-Long-Prison-Sentences-in-Context.pdf (“The find-
ings of this report . . . . compel us to question whether the broad-scale imposition of such
penalties has resulted in the use of life imprisonment in ways that too often represent both
ineffective and inhumane public policy.”).
90 See ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF
LIFE AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
still-life-americas-increasing-use-life-long-term-sentences/.
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LWOP sentencing.91  That said, public opinion strongly supports LWOP
when it is framed as an alternative to the death penalty.  For example, a Flor-
ida poll in 2016 found that fifty-seven percent of participants preferred
LWOP to the death penalty (although forty percent also mistakenly believed
that persons sentenced to LWOP could be released from prison).92
We note also that some studies have removed states where LWOP was
introduced before 1976, reasoning that these observations are irrelevant to
the hypothesis that LWOP might affect death sentencing.93  Modifying the
regressions to exclude such states further lessens any apparent effects on
death sentencing.  Table 4 in Appendix A provides a complete table of the
year in which LWOP sentencing was introduced as a punishment for
murder.94
D. State-Level Capital Defense
The provision of capital defense at a state level results in a consistent,
strong reduction in capital sentencing across models.  The empirical findings
are presented alongside an explanation of why lawmakers and courts have
pushed for more effective representation of capital defendants.  This Article
also describes nuanced variations in state approaches to capital defense
reform, and finally explores an alternative model.  The simplified coding
used in this alternative model helps to establish that the empirical findings in
this Section are not sensitive to subjective classification choices.  We consist-
ently find that states that create a state-level capital defense function tend to
see lower volumes of capital sentencing.  The relationship between capital
defense and death sentencing is stronger and more robust than that of other
variables measured, rejecting the null hypothesis at the 0.001 level in both
panel models, and exhibiting low standard error.
As early as 1932, the Supreme Court placed focus on the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel in capital trials, holding in Powell v. Alabama that there
is a right of indigent defendants to have counsel appointed in death penalty
cases.95  More recently in Strickland v. Washington, the Court set out a stan-
dard for the effectiveness of trial representation.96  Since that time, most
91 See LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.
& Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (providing a collection of perspectival essays on the rise of life
without parole sentencing); see also LEIGEY, supra note 14 (recording personal interviews on
philosophy and daily life with inmates serving life without parole sentences).
92 New Poll Finds “Strong Majority” of Floridians Prefer Life Without Parole over Death Penalty,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6535 (last visited Nov. 28,
2018).
93 For example, Mississippi has had the sentencing option on the books since 1880.
See infra Appendix A.
94 Alaska is the only state in which the life without parole sentence has not been intro-
duced. See infra Appendix A, Table 4.
95 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (establishing that attorneys should be
appointed for capital cases even without request by the defendant).
96 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing as a two-part test for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that: (i) counsel’s performance fell below an objec-
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states have taken on the task of ensuring higher qualifications of competence
for attorneys appointed in capital trials.  Despite emphasis by the American
Bar Association97 and the Institute for Law and Justice98 on suitable guide-
lines for capital defense qualification, studies released between 1999 and
2002 have identified problematic aspects of appointed capital defense in Illi-
nois,99 Texas,100 and Washington.101  In 2001, Supreme Court Justices infor-
mally highlighted the issue.  Justice Ginsburg declared that “[p]eople who
are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty,”102 and Justice
O’Connor highlighted the need for minimum standards for appointment
and adequate compensation of appointed capital defenders in public com-
ments questioning the fairness of administration of capital punishment.103
Reforming capital defense at a state level serves, first and foremost, to
improve the prospects of defendants at trial.  Professional capital defense
offices can undertake their job as a team to meet the demands of modern
capital trial.  As one of us has described, regional capital defense offices, like
those created in Virginia, can retain social workers and investigators to con-
duct factual investigation, and can reduce costs since they rely more on
nonlawyers, while more effectively representing their clients.104  Death pen-
tive standard of reasonableness, and (ii) counsel’s performance gives rise to a reasonable
probability that if counsel had performed adequately, the result would have been
different).
97 See Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003).
98 INST. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
(2000), https://www.mynlada.org/defender/DOJ/standardsv3/welcome.html.
99 See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Part 2: Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict, CHI. TRIBUNE
(Nov. 15, 1999), https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-xpm-1999-11-15-chi-
991115deathillinois2-story.html (surveying court records from 1976–1999 that show twenty-
six death row inmates convicted “have received a new trial or sentencing because their
attorneys’ incompetence rendered the verdict or sentence unfair”).
100 See TEX. DEF. SERV., LETHAL INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL COMBINATION OF INCOMPETENT
ATTORNEYS AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS IN TEXAS DEATH PENALTY APPEALS, at x (2002),
http://www.fordarlieroutier.org/RelatedLinks/LethalIndifference/front.pdf (“Death row
inmates today face a one-in-three chance of being executed without having the case prop-
erly investigated by a competent attorney and without having any claims of innocence or
unfairness presented or heard.”).
101 See Lise Olsen, Uncertain Justice, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 5, 2001), https:/
/www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Uncertain-Justice-1061663.php (finding that one-fifth of
the eighty-four people who faced execution from 1981–2000 were represented by lawyers
who had been, or were later, disbarred, suspended, or arrested).
102 Justice Backs Death Penalty Freeze, CBS NEWS (Apr. 10, 2001), http://www.cbsnews.com
/news/justice-backs-death-penalty-freeze/ (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
103 See Associated Press, O’Connor Questions Death Peanlty, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/04/us/o-connor-questions-death-penalty.html (quot-
ing Justice Sandra Day O’Connor).
104 See Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, supra note 4, at
699 (“This study suggests that it does not take a Dream Team to effectively represent a
capital defendant.  But it does take a team—a team of specialist capital defense lawyers and
investigators, preferably working in a single office . . . that . . . . understand[s] the different
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alty trials are completely unlike much of the work that criminal defense law-
yers ordinarily perform.  They consist in two separate trial phases, and the
sentencing phase relies on the ability of the lawyers to present evidence con-
cerning the entire life history of the client, which in turn requires careful
investigation and presentation of mental health evidence, educational
records, social welfare records, drug and alcohol abuse evidence, evidence of
any childhood abuse, and other types of evidence that is typically not mar-
shalled at a standard criminal sentencing.105
The secondary impacts of reform go beyond success in court.  Effective
defense also reduces the incentive for prosecutors to seek the death penalty.
They will face lawyers that have institutional knowledge and skill at represent-
ing clients in a capital case, as opposed to an inexperienced local attorney
lacking resources to mount a serious defense.106  Studies have also argued
that funding capital defense on a state level can reduce the overall cost of
capital representation and improves the quality of defense.107
way that a death penalty case must be litigated from its inception—long before trial—and
preferably and typically without a trial.”).
105 See, e.g., DOTTIE CARMICHAEL & HEATHER CASPERS, PUB. POLICY RESEARCH INST., JUDG-
MENT AND JUSTICE: AN EVALUATION OF THE TEXAS REGIONAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR CAPITAL
CASES 71–72 (2013), http://ppri.tamu.edu/files/Capital_Defender_Report.pdf (“RPDO
attorneys begin working on behalf of the client sooner than private assigned counsel. . . .
RPDO attorneys focus services to build a trusting relationship with clients. . . . Public
defenders’ non-attorney defense team members begin assembling facts and information
much more quickly than other court-appointed defense teams.”); JON B. GOULD & LISA
GREENMAN, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER SERVICES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES: UPDATE ON THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY CASES 91–92 (2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/Feder-
alDPCost2010.pdf (“Counsel in a federal death penalty case must not only be skilled in
defending the charged offense, e.g., a homicide, but also must be thoroughly knowledgea-
ble about a complex body of constitutional law and special procedures that do not apply in
other criminal cases.  They must be able to direct extensive and sophisticated investigations
into guilt/innocence and mitigation of sentence.  They must have the counseling skills to
advise a client deciding between pleading guilty in return for a life sentence and proceed-
ing to trial where the sentencing options are death or life imprisonment without the possi-
bility of release.  They must have communication skills to establish trust with clients, family
members, witnesses . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
106 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Coun-
ties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010) (arguing that the high degree of
institutional knowledge required for capital litigation demands specialization among both
defenders and prosecutors).
107 Two common themes in studies of capital defense costs are the importance of quali-
fied counsel to manage the legal complexity of cases, and the clear increase in cost associ-
ated with capital charging. See, e.g., CARMICHAEL & CASPERS, supra note 105, at 70–71;
GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 105, at 24, 65; James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, Measur-
ing the Effect of Defense Counsel on Homicide Case Outcomes 3 (Dec. 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/241158.pdf.  These
studies provide necessary elements for the argument that state provision of capital defense
should ultimately reduce cost, as compared to appointment systems.
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Not all states act in the same way or with equal effectiveness to provide
capital representation.  Establishing guidelines and promising state funding
can help to incentivize some lawyers to specialize in capital defense, but
neither measure guarantees good defense like creating a state office for such
specialists.  Similarly, granting counties the option to create their own offices
for capital defense can be useful if counties have resources to provide effec-
tive representation.108  That said, we recognize that state offices are not all
equally effective.  Certain state offices have seen reductions in funding for
state-level capital defender offices since their establishment; Georgia is an
example, where judges have called the office “systematically broken.”109  Or
for example, in Arkansas, the state’s supreme court decided in a 1993 opin-
ion that, on constitutional grounds, the task of providing adequate represen-
tation to capital-eligible defendants fell to the state, not counties.110  As a
result, Arkansas allocated the task to the Public Defense Commission in
1994.111  However, reports by that Commission have cited to decades of
underfunding.112  Underfunding may be restricting the effectiveness of such
offices.  Nor is information about adequacy of funding easy to collect.113  As
a result, we note that although our analysis focuses on whether a state for-
mally created a state trial-level defense function, the mere creation of that
function may not produce a dramatic change in indigent defense if the office
lacks adequate resources.  Our findings may not fully capture the difference
that having an office for capital trial defense makes, because our findings
include states in which there is an office, but a severely underfunded one.
Since our results point to state capital defense as a critical legislative
enactment, we conducted further analysis to confirm this model’s sensitivity
to decisions we made on whether to classify a state as having limited capital
representation resources at the state level, even if it did not have an office.
108 See infra Appendix A (detailing coding of state efforts in providing capital defense).
109 Kyle Martin, Judge’s Decision Brings to Light Problems in Georgia Capital Defender Pro-
gram, AUGUSTA CHRON. (July 14, 2012), https://www.augustachronicle.com/news/crime-
courts/2012-07-14/judges-decision-brings-light-problems-georgia-capital-defender-pro-
gram (describing how funding for the office “dropped from $7 million in 2005 to $4.5
million” in 2008, and where defense attorneys requested a judge hold the state in con-
tempt for nonpayment of capital defense attorneys).
110 State v. Independence County, 850 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Ark. 1993), superseded by statute,
Arkansas Public Defender Commission Act of 1993, 1993 Ark. Acts 1193 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-87-201–214 (West 2018)), as recognized in State v. Crittenden County, 896
S.W.2d 881 (Ark. 1995).
111 ARK. PUB. DEF. COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF BUDGET REQUEST 493 (2015), https://
www.dfa.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/budgetManuals/0324_public_defender2015.pdf
112 Id. at 494.
113 See SPANGENBERG GRP., RATES OF COMPENSATION FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN
CAPITAL CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW (2007), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_2007
felony_comp_rates_update_capital.authcheckdam.pdf (classifying states’ capital defense
provision in terms of (a) how compensation rates are determined, (b) whether rates are
paid by county or state, (c) distinctions between in-court and out-of-court pay, and (d) per-
case maximum compensation).
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This secondary coding simply distinguishes states where state-administered
offices for capital defense exist versus those where such an office does not
exist.  The results show similarly large and robust effects, which confirm two
critical points.  First, the importance of capital defense reform is not depen-
dent upon sensitive classification choices based on funding.  Capital defense
continued to be the most influential variable in the model, even when varia-
ble coding is stripped down such that states were given no credit for partial
measures.  The secondary model also confirms the straightforward conten-
tion of advocacy groups and state offices for capital defense that complain of
underfunding: states that achieve only limited gains in the provision of capi-
tal defense do not create significant reduction in death sentencing.
E. State Ring v. Arizona Compliance
One could expect that having a jury make a death sentencing decision,
rather than a judge, who might be elected, could impact the frequency of
death sentences.  When Ring v. Arizona was decided in 2002, many states did
not require that death sentences be imposed by the jury, or they permitted
the jury only to make a recommendation, but the judge would make the final
determination.  Practitioners predicted post-Ring that “juries will likely have a
harder time reaching a unanimous verdict when the aggravating factor(s)
themselves require additional findings of fact beyond the guilty verdict.”114
Many experts predicted the same result; for example, James Liebman noted:
“There is quite general agreement that over time and over geography, the
likelihood of getting a death sentence is greater from a judge than from a
jury.”115  Others, like Carol Steiker, suspected that the effect might be more
mixed, given how in some states, like Alabama, judges frequently overrode
jury life sentences, but in states like Delaware, judges often changed jury
death sentences to life sentences.116
We found, consistent with Steiker’s skepticism, that the requirement that
a jury make the final determination in capital sentencing exhibited no relia-
ble impact on actual death sentencing nationally.  This Section interprets the
results of modeling to show why such a conclusion is appropriate.  We dis-
played, in Table 1, a moderately high coefficient associated with sentencing
procedure in linear regression.  However, Table 1 also shows how the impact
of compliance with Ring is lessened considerably by accounting for fixed and
random effects.  In the panel models, failure to reject the null hypothesis and
higher standard error values call into question the significance of the small
remaining correlation coefficient.
114 Joseph M. Bernstein, Keeping the Death Penalty Alive, DEL. LAW., Winter 2003–04, at 9,
10.
115 Adam Liptak, Fewer Death Sentences Likely if Juries Make Ultimate Decision, Experts Say,
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/25/us/supreme-court-
states-fewer-death-sentences-likely-if-juries-make-ultimate.html.
116 See Carol S. Steiker, Commentary, Things Fall Apart, but the Center Holds: The Supreme
Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2002).
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In 2002, the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona required a jury determi-
nation at the final phase of capital sentencing, extending its prior ruling in
Apprendi v. New Jersey that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires
that the jury make findings regarding any aggravating factors in crimes.117
The Arizona death penalty procedure in question permitted the trial judge
alone to decide whether any aggravating factors were present, to permit a
death sentence, and the trial judge alone would decide whether to impose a
death sentence.118  The Court held that “[c]apital defendants, no less than
noncapital defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punish-
ment.”119  The Ring holding resulted from a somewhat convoluted jurispru-
dential history.  The Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment right to
a trial by jury had never been interpreted as absolute: throughout most of the
twentieth century, the Court generally viewed judicial discretion in capital
sentencing with approval.120 Ring specifically overturned the Court’s 1990
decision in Walton v. Arizona,121 which narrowly upheld a state practice of
granting judges plenary authority at the sentencing stage after a conviction
found in a jury trial.122  Ten years later, the Court’s holding in Apprendi v.
New Jersey requires a jury determination on any matter that “increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.”123  In
Apprendi, a plurality of four Justices argued that the Apprendi holding was
inapposite to capital eligibility under Walton.  Only Justice Thomas’s concur-
ring opinion suggested the matter required further consideration.124  Faced
with the question two years later, the Court in Ring ruled 7–2 to overturn the
Walton holding in light of Apprendi.  In dissent, Justice O’Connor feared that
the Ring ruling could be used to challenge many hundreds of prisoners who
had been already sentenced to death; subsequent decisions confirmed the
nonretroactivity of the requirements imposed by Ring.125
117 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
118 See id. at 588.
119 Id. at 589.
120 See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.
Ct. 616 (2016); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
121 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring, 536 U.S. at 609,
122 Arizona’s statutory definition of a valid aggravating factor hinged on the words
“especially heinous, cruel, or depraved.” Walton, 497 U.S. at 646.  In Walton, the Court
reversed its trend of striking down such descriptive language as impermissibly vague. Id. at
646–47.  Dissenting opinions endorsed by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
focused primarily on the Eighth Amendment and due process concerns at play in the case.
Id. at 674 (Brennan, J., dissenting ); id. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Only a separate
opinion by Justice Stevens argued that the Sixth Amendment, correctly interpreted, pro-
hibited the practice of allowing a judge’s sole determination to expose a criminal defen-
dant to the death penalty. Id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
124 Id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring).
125 Ring, 536 U.S. at 620–21 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004).
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The Supreme Court noted in Ring that most death penalty states had
already committed factfinding in capital trials to the jury.126  Nonetheless, at
the time, five states gave the judge sole authority to enter a death sentence,
and four more “hybrid” states permitted a judicial role in factfinding.127
States reacted to Ring at different times.  For example, Indiana acted to revise
its procedural structures even before the Ring holding was official; in the
wake of the decision, other states followed suit.128  Thus, states reacted to
Ring in both different ways and at different times, making it a useful subject
for empirical examination.129
We found that the impression of any correlation between this Ring v.
Arizona compliance and capital punishment in the linear model is largely an
artifact of the overwhelming impact of two major states that have continu-
ously allowed individual judges to make the final determination in death sen-
tencing: Florida and Alabama.  Florida did not comply until after 2016, when
the Supreme Court struck down its statute in Hurst v. Florida.130  In Alabama,
judges continued, until the statute was amended in 2017, to exercise their
legal authority to impose death despite a contrary jury determination, and
there is no dispute that within Alabama, capital sentencing procedure has
directly produced more death sentences.  The Alabama scheme required that
the jury make a recommendation concerning a death sentence, and the jury
must find that at least one aggravating factor exists.131  However, the jury
recommendation was only advisory and a judge could override it.132  Follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hurst, there were questions about whether
Alabama was in fact complying with Ring.133  These questions were put to
rest in 2017 when Alabama enacted legislation ending the ability of judges to
override a jury determination in a death penalty case; however, Alabama still
permits a non-unanimous 10–2 jury vote to convict.134
The effect on death sentencing of whether a state has judge or jury sen-
tencing can be isolated statistically by including interaction variables in the
126 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6 (majority opinion).
127 Id.
128 U.S. Supreme Court: Ring v. Arizona, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/us-supreme-court-ring-v-arizona (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).  In Florida,
Maryland, and Montana, defendants were all granted temporary stays of execution pend-
ing the Ring decision. Id.
129 We do not code as part of this analysis whether states require that jurors find aggra-
vating factors outweigh mitigating factors by a particular standard of proof, see, e.g., Oken
v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1131 (Md. 2003), or whether aggravating factors must be specified
by statute, see, e.g., State v. Ross, 720 S.E.2d 403, 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), or whether
judges or jurors decide issues of intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia; we focus
only on the Ring issue of whether the judge or jury makes the death sentencing decision.
130 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
131 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a)–(f) (2018).
132 2017 Ala. Legis. Serv. 131 (West) (repealing ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e), which had
previously allowed the judge to override a jury recommendation).
133 See Steiker, supra note 116, at 1479.
134 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46–47.
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model.135  What interaction variables do is measure the cross-effects between
independent variables.  That analysis confirms that the effects of final sen-
tencing procedure are indistinguishable from the primary effects of homi-
cides on death sentencing.  The apparent effect of Ring v. Arizona
compliance on capital sentencing is mainly attributable to the use of judge
sentencing in states with an otherwise high disposition for the death penalty.
Additional scrutiny also reveals trends in important states that seem to dis-
pute any effect of Ring compliance on sentencing.
Arizona provides a useful illustration.  Table 2 presents the years sur-
rounding Ring (decided in 2002) in Arizona.  Arizona was among a number
of states that made changes to its sentencing procedures in the immediate
wake of Ring v. Arizona,136 yet it did not experience a persistent decline in
capital sentencing.
TABLE 2:  ARIZONA DEATH SENTENCING, BEFORE AND AFTER RING V. ARIZONA
Year Executions 
Capital  
Sentences Homicides 
1996 2 5 430 
1997 2 8 409 
1998 4 6 421 
1999 7 6 470 
2000 3 7 410 
2001 0 7 494 
2002 0 1 504 
2003 0 9 498 
2004 0 4 509 
2005 0 8 532 
2006 0 6 549 
2007 1 7 528 
2008 0 6 474 
2009 0 14 387 
2010 1 9 418 
2011 4 8 402 
Sources: FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports, the Death Penalty Information Center, and death
sentencing data collected by the authors
135 Including interaction variables between homicides and other legislative changes is
justified by the large effect of homicides in the model. See GELMAN & HILL, supra note 61,
at 36 (“In practice, inputs that have large main effects also tend to have large interactions
with other inputs . . . .”).
136 See U.S. Supreme Court: Ring v. Arizona, supra note 128.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 32 12-FEB-19 9:06
1286 notre dame law review [vol. 94:3
Beyond the enforcement of legal procedure, the practical effects of
ensuring capital defendants access to sentencing by a jury are somewhat
opaque.137  Studies by Reuters and other public interest organizations show
that judges whose terms are subject to election uphold death sentences with
twice the frequency of appointed judges.138  The issue of judicial election is
not measured in these data, but discussion of the troubling political conse-
quences of introducing capital punishment in judicial elections highlights
the danger of allocating final decisionmaking in this process to a single indi-
vidual.139  On the other hand, since judges are presumably more willing to
uphold laws to the letter, capital defenders are known to prefer a bench trial
when legally complex defenses such as mental illness are in play.  The prefer-
ence for judges or juries varies among jurisdictions, and the decision usually
involves individual characteristics of a case.
A final explanation for why Ring compliance produces insignificant
results derives from the observation that death sentencing procedures vary
subtly from state to state.140  The results in this Article are based on coding
137 Supreme Court opinions provide some language suggesting that jury decisions are
fairer to the defendant. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (“In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important comparative advantage
over judges.  In principle, they are more attuned to ‘the community’s moral sensibility,’
because they ‘reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the community
as a whole.’  Hence they are more likely to ‘express the conscience of the community on
the ultimate question of life or death,’ and better able to determine in the particular case
the need for retribution, namely, ‘an expression of the community’s belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response
may be the penalty of death.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); then quoting
id. at 486; then quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); and then quot-
ing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976))).
138 Elected Judges Uphold More Death Sentences, Study Finds, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Nov. 4,
2014), https://eji.org/news/study-elected-judges-uphold-more-death-sentences; Dan
Levine & Kristina Cooke, Uneven Justice: In States with Elected High Court Judges, a Harder Line
on Capital Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/
special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges/.
139 See Richard C. Dieter, Killing for Votes: The Dangers of Politicizing the Death Penalty
Process, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 1996), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/killing-
for-votes.
140 State legal standards are differentiated in two ways.  First, Alabama requires agree-
ment by at least ten jurors to make a death recommendation; Delaware goes further,
requiring that a death recommendation be made by a unanimous jury. See U.S. Supreme
Court: Ring v. Arizona, supra note 128; see also Sean O’Sullivan, Jury’s Votes in Capital Cases
Don’t Always Sway Judges, NEWS J. (Del.), Feb. 25, 2011, at A1, A9.  Second, Florida law is
construed to require that judges may overturn a jury recommendation only in cases when
“no reasonable person” would vote for life, while other states allow judges more unfettered
authority. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE
11 (2011), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/death-penalty-in-alabama-judge-override.pdf
(citing Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam)).  The “no reasonable
juror” standard is not directly present in current Florida law. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)
(2018).  The standard, as modified by Tedder, becomes similar to laws in Ohio and Califor-
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that take states at their legislative word if they permit a judge to impose a
death sentence (even if a jury also deliberated and chose not to impose a
death sentence).  Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Montana are coded as
states still using a judge sentencing procedure as of 2001.  As Figure 6 below
illustrates, however, the actual use of a judicial override is not common in
most states.  Alabama is the only state in which judges actively exercised their
power to override jury decisions to impose death sentences in recent years
(until the practice was ended legislatively in 2017); as noted, in contrast, Del-
aware judges had typically used their power to reduce death sentences to life
sentences.  Figure 6, which was presented by Justice Sotomayor in her dissent
from denial of certiorari in Woodward v. Alabama, illustrates clearly that the
judicial override mechanism has and continues to produce sentences of capi-
tal punishment.
FIGURE 6:  DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED BY JUDGE OVERRIDE OF A CONTRARY
JURY DETERMINATION141
Today, all states have ended the practice of judicial overrides in death
penalty cases.142  What we show is that while current law holds that judge
determination in final capital sentencing violates a defendant’s constitutional
rights, compliance with this requirement shows no empirical impact on num-
bers of state death sentences.  Thus, as with the examination of LWOP adop-
tion, once again we find that legal changes in death sentencing procedures
and options did not demonstrably affect death sentencing rates.  In contrast,
nia, which both permit judges to override a jury decision in “exceptional circumstances.”
See U.S. Supreme Court: Ring v. Arizona, supra note 128.
141 Woodward v. State, 123 So. 3d 989 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
142 The Delaware Supreme Court has concluded that its judicial override violates Ring
and Hurst.  Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 34 12-FEB-19 9:06
1288 notre dame law review [vol. 94:3
we found that changing the resources available to the defense, in a consistent
statewide matter, did substantially affect state death sentencing rates, even
when controlling for the decline in homicides.
III. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, we explore the implications of the findings for litigation
strategy, policy, constitutional regulation of the death penalty, and for future
death penalty trends.  We call on courts to focus more closely on the struc-
tural needs of a minimally effective capital defense.  It takes an office and a
team to effectively handle a capital trial, and the type of postconviction
review focusing on discrete questions of investigation and performance in a
particular case neglects those structural needs.  More states have recognized
the structural demands of capital representation, despite the lack of gui-
dance from the courts (and in part because offices are more cost-effective),
but the result has been that the death penalty remains prominent in outlier
states that continue to rely on court-appointed and local lawyers without the
tools to effectively handle capital litigation.  This has real Sixth Amendment
implications, as well as Eighth Amendment implications concerning the arbi-
trariness of the death penalty.  This also suggests that the death penalty will
linger largely in those states that fail to provide adequate defense resources at
the trial level.
A. Structural Sixth Amendment Implications
The most direct implication of the prominent role of capital defense
reform is further judicial emphasis on the right to effective assistance by
counsel, focusing not just on the post hoc reasonableness of the attorney’s
performance in a given case, but whether there were structures in place—
like an office—to make effective representation possible.  It is unsurprising,
in a sense, that improvements in capital defense are associated with more
pronounced and impactful reductions in capital sentencing.  Attorney
involvement in a case is far longer than any jury’s involvement and can help
ensure proper investigation, favorable presentation of evidence, and ade-
quate legal protection for a defendant prior to trial.143  Improvement to state
capital representation systems not only enhances the quality of representa-
tion, but also yields prompter appointment of attorneys in capital cases and a
localized communal knowledge center for capital defense.  After exploring
the scope for Supreme Court action in ensuring effective counsel, this Sec-
tion highlights the development of specialized techniques for death penalty
cases that could benefit any litigator involved in capital trial.
143 Jury selection techniques play a key role in the success of specialized capital defend-
ers. See CARMICHAEL & CASPERS, supra note 105, at 45 (elaborating the role of nontradi-
tional defense experts); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding that a
defendant may challenge for cause a prospective juror who would automatically vote to
impose the death penalty in every capital case).
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Capital defense is, in nearly all cases, indigent defense.  This provides
helpful perspective for understanding the limits on judicial action.  The
Supreme Court set out in Strickland v. Washington a highly deferential stan-
dard of review for claims of ineffective counsel, asking whether an attorney
provided unreasonably ineffective assistance (given the range of perform-
ance among lawyers in the profession), and whether there is a reasonable
probability those failures contributed to the outcome at trial (or constituted
“prejudice”).144  In capital cases, the Court has occasionally granted relief on
Sixth Amendment claims, particularly in cases in which there was an utter
failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase
in capital trials.145  While the Court has cited to the American Bar Associa-
tion standards for capital representation, the Court has never imposed rules
that provide the same type of guidance and detail that those standards set
out, including as to the mitigation function in capital cases.146  Mitigation
investigators may be indispensable, but it has been the states providing
resources for offices to retain them on staff, not the federal courts that have
required doing so.147
The Supreme Court has never suggested that states have an obligation to
provide any particular form of capital defense function or any level of
resources to support that function.  The appointment of indigent defenders
by county judges is a system fraught with anecdotes of utterly inexperienced,
intoxicated, or simply exhausted lawyers;148 nearly every state’s initial efforts
at capital defense were merely extensions of this basic appointment system.
For decades, fee caps and pay for attorneys appointed in capital cases were
often extremely low.149  The Court’s ability to impose procedures upon states
for selection and appointment of capital defenders is limited by basic federal-
ism concerns.  But as it becomes increasingly clear that improved representa-
tion at the outset of a capital proceeding can substantially alter outcomes, it
144 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing as a two-part
test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims that: (i) counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) counsel’s performance gives rise to a reason-
able probability that if counsel had performed adequately, the result would have been
different); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Joshua Kastenberg, Nearing
Thirty Years: The Burger Court, Strickland v. Washington, and the Parameters of the Right to
Counsel, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 215, 237–50 (2013) (elaborating on the relationship
between Strickland and Cronic).
145 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 534 (2003).
146 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense
Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008); see also Russell Stetler, The
Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned Moral Response in Capital Sentencing,
11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 262 (2007).
147 See Helen G. Berrigan, The Indispensable Role of the Mitigation Specialist in a Capital
Case: A View from the Federal Bench, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 819, 825–30 (2008).
148 See Death Penalty Representation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/death-penalty-representation (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
149 See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services
to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 36 12-FEB-19 9:06
1290 notre dame law review [vol. 94:3
may be appropriate for courts at both the state and federal levels to examine
not just whether the particular lawyers in a case acted reasonably in con-
ducting their representation, but whether they had the structural resources
to perform effectively.150  State courts have been more open than federal
courts in considering such structural Sixth Amendment claims, including at
the trial and appellate stages, when limitations on postconviction relief do
not apply.151
States have adopted a range of regulatory approaches toward enhancing
the capital trial function.  Some states, like New York, created capital trial
offices immediately when they adopted the death penalty.152  More states, as
described, took a decade or more to do so.  States like Virginia adopted
regional offices to handle capital trials, while Colorado, North Carolina, and
many others adopted a single, central public defender’s office for capital tri-
als.153  While the most effective reforms of capital defense create dedicated
state offices that handle representation, Arizona and Texas have developed
shared resources for participating counties.154
The resources and techniques developed by these and other capital
defender services have for some time also assisted capital defenders more
informally, through training and consultation, as well as through nonprofit
capital defense firms that consult and work on capital trials.155  Our findings
regarding the formal establishing of statewide defense functions certainly do
not capture all of the impact that these changes have produced in capital
cases.  After all, the defense-lawyering effect may be felt to some degree even
in states that lack state-level capital defense offices, because better practices
150 But see Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After
‘Gideon,’ ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433/ (“I think
the Court doesn’t have the initiative to get involved in improving the administration of
justice in every state . . . .  The Court’s really not the institution to get involved in that.”
(quoting former Justice John Paul Stevens)).
151 See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 710 (2007).
152 See History, N.Y. CAP. DEFENDER OFF., http://www.nycdo.org/ (last visited Dec. 23,
2018).
153 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-101 to -106 (West 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498
(West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.01 (West 2018); see also Garrett, The Decline of the
Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 666, 720–21.
154 See TX. REG’L PUB. DEF. FOR CAPITAL CASES, FISCAL YEAR 2014 SUMMARY, http://
rpdo.org/media/1037/fy14rpdosummary.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
155 See, e.g., Protecting the Attorney/Client Relationship: “Bakesale Justice” for Calvin Burdine,
GULF REGION ADVOCACY CTR., www.gracelaw.org/burdine2011.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2017); see also Richard Acello, A New Defense Approach to Storytelling Changes Capital Cases in
Texas, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_new_
defense_approach_to_storytelling_changes_capital_cases_in_texas (describing the unor-
thodox strategies of Texas’s Regional Capital Defenders for Capital Cases Office, including
aggressive requests for court funding of defense experts, open acknowledgment of litiga-
tion costs in settlement negotiations, and radical new narratives constructed with the help
of creative nonfiction writers).
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have been shared among capital trial lawyers that access these resources in
the larger capital defense community.
Eve Brensike Primus has argued that courts should adopt a structural
reform-oriented approach toward criminal defense representation.156  With
no right to counsel during postconviction proceedings and a focus on
prejudice and technical procedural limitations during habeas proceedings,
indigent defense–related claims often do not address underlying failings in
the system.157  However, during appeals, when there is a right to counsel,
courts could be more open to consider Sixth Amendment claims based on a
broader record.158  That may be the best forum to consider whether as a
system, a state is providing sufficient resources for minimally effective capital
representation.
B. Policy Implications
For state policymakers who seek fairer application of the death penalty,
no option is likely to bear more fruit than state-level reform of capital
defense.  The results have been striking in states that have created such
offices.  In contrast, reforms will be particularly important in states like Ala-
bama, California, and Florida, which are particular outliers in nonprovision
of state-level capital defense.  Most modern death sentences are now entered
in California, so capital defense resources in that state will be particularly
important.  We note that Alabama and Florida had been holdouts on Ring
compliance, and the coincidence of these measures is significant.  The often
emotional backdrop of capital trial has prompted critics to emphasize the
critical need to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process.159  State
employment of capital defenders is a key way of ensuring that integrity.  Flor-
ida and Alabama also exhibit characteristics that have been identified by
other papers as key indicia of overapplication of the death penalty.  Both
states are home to many jurisdictions with substantial wealth disparity and
racial heterogeneity.160  Among the states that now impose the largest share
of national death sentences, Florida and Alabama have the greatest scope for
improvements in the fairness of the penalty’s structure.  This analysis does
not attempt to discount conscientious administrative efforts by either state.
156 See Primus, supra note 151, at 679.
157 See Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (1999).
158 See id.; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383
(2007) (generally describing systemic litigation approaches toward criminal justice issues
and criminal procedure claims).
159 See generally Gershowitz, supra note 106; see also Dieter, supra note 139 (citing
instances of politically motivated disparagement of death penalty lawyers by judges, prose-
cutors, and members of state pardon boards).
160 See generally Johnson et al., supra note 40 (identifying racial heterogeneity, income
distribution and geographic location in the southern United States as relevant traits in
predicting the use of the death penalty).
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There may also be costs and benefits to emphasizing the state’s role in
administering the death penalty.  States can both enhance and disable the
capital defense function, and as we have described, some states have created
state-level capital defense offices but then starved them of resources.  Adam
Gershowitz has argued that perhaps the counties’ role in death sentencing
should be eliminated entirely—that a state capital prosecutor should be
tasked with supervising capital prosecutions, just as some states have created
state capital defense functions.161  Stephen Smith and James Liebman have
responded that it is the state subsidization of the costs of death sentencing
that have permitted an overproduction of death sentences.162  California vot-
ers recently approved a proposition, narrowly to be sure, to expedite judicial
review in capital cases, and have rejected a proposition to abolish the death
penalty.163  In states where capital punishment is popular, it may be unlikely
that lawmakers will improve capital defense resources.  That said, most death
penalty states have done so over the past two decades, perhaps fearing Sixth
Amendment reversals or to conserve costs in capital trials, which can be
extremely expensive.
C. Eighth Amendment Implications
The Supreme Court ruled in Furman v. Georgia that the Eighth Amend-
ment forbade as cruel and unusual death sentences that are “wantonly” or
“freakishly” imposed.164  Since then, the Court has examined death sentenc-
ing practices to assure that jurors have discretion to make moral decisions
concerning whether to impose the death penalty, while at the same time, the
Court aims to regulate and channel that discretion so that the results are
consistent.  However, the Justices have not closely considered statistical stud-
ies of death sentencing as part of that analysis.  The Court most notably failed
to grant relief based on the findings of the Baldus study in McCleskey v.
Kemp.165  The Supreme Court does continue to examine the practice and
consensus among the states when imposing per se restrictions on use of the
punishment.166
161 Gershowitz, supra note 106, at 342.
162 See Liebman & Clarke, supra note 36, at 344–45 (quoting Stephen F. Smith,
Response, Localism and Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC. 105, 120 (2011)).
163 See Jazmine Ulloa, In California, Death Penalty Abolitionists Pledge to Keep Fighting, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-death-penalty-prop-62-
prop-66-20161109-htmlstory.html.
164 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); see, e.g., Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
165 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
166 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“A majority of States have rejected
the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this
is required by the Eighth Amendment.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002)
(“Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation
providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of
States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides pow-
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The Court has highlighted how few states or how few death sentences
have been carried out as part of consideration of “objective indicia of
[national] consensus” concerning the form of punishment.167  In 1988, in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality concluded that the Eighth Amendment
barred execution of an individual who was less than sixteen years old at the
time of the offense; at the time, eighteen legislatures barred the practice and
none permitted it explicitly.168  In 1989, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held
that execution of the intellectually disabled was permitted where only two
states prohibited it.169  In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court found that
national consensus had changed and highlighted how eighteen states barred
the death penalty for the intellectually disabled—and even where permitted,
such death sentences were rare, with only five states having done so since
1989.170  In Ring v. Arizona, the Court noted how “the great majority of States
responded to this Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the pres-
ence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those deter-
minations to the jury.”171  In abolishing the juvenile death penalty in its 2005
ruling in Roper v. Simmons, the Court described how thirty states prohibited
it,172 and the execution of juvenile offenders was so infrequent that few
examples could be identified.173  In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of an individual who raped but
did not kill a child, noting that forty-four states and the federal government
barred the death penalty for child rape.174
Eighth Amendment concerns should be heightened today, not regard-
ing specific types of offenders, but the death penalty as generally adminis-
tered.  As noted, in 2016, only fourteen states imposed death sentences—in
2017, it was again fourteen states.175  The rate of change and the “consistency
of the direction of change” in the past two decades is marked.176  That said,
the Supreme Court’s decisions like Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy dealt with spe-
cific types of capital defendants who were particularly vulnerable, and not the
broader argument that the entire death penalty is now a rare and arbitrary
event.  To be sure, in 2015, in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer,
erful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.”).
167 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–64.
168 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion); id. at 829
n.29.
169 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
170 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–16.
171 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607–08 (2002).
172 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
173 Id. at 565.
174 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421, 423 (2008).
175 See Bazelon, supra note 3 (“Of the 26 remaining states, only 14 handed down any
death sentences last year . . . .”); see also GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 4, at 132–66;
Death Sentences in 2017, DEATH PENALTY INFOR. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/2017-
sentencing (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
176 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
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joined by Justice Ginsburg, emphasized that the death penalty has “increas-
ingly become unusual,” having “declined rapidly” in the last fifteen years.177
That reasoning could be buttressed by these findings.  That reasoning is also
relevant at the state level.  The Connecticut Supreme Court, in its 2015 rul-
ing finding the state death penalty unconstitutional under the state law,
emphasized geographic disparities and data concerning arbitrariness and
bias in patterns of sentencing, in its ruling.178  Most recently, a unanimous
decision by the Washington Supreme Court applied state constitutional law
to find the death penalty unconstitutional.179  We note that the U.S.
Supreme Court denied a certiorari petition based on data concerning pat-
terns of death sentencing in Arizona.180
D. Implications for Future Death Penalty Trends
The implication of these data is that the death penalty will continue its
steady decline.  To be sure, death penalty trends have reversed themselves in
the past; death sentences increased dramatically following the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Furman, and they continued to increase through the
1990s.181  However, the decline in death sentencing has been two decades in
the making, and a reversal might take some time.  These trends are therefore
likely to persist, even if the portion of death sentencing that is linked to
homicide rates may change if homicide rates increase in the future.  It is less
clear that judges will rely on these data in Eighth Amendment rulings on the
death penalty.  That said, Sixth Amendment rulings regarding the impor-
tance of an established mitigation function and statewide uniform trial repre-
sentation might be bolstered by these findings, perhaps more so than in the
Eighth Amendment context (about which county-level data analysis that we
have separately conducted may have more traction).182
Justices reach for wider statistical results for perspective in all areas of
law, yet the death penalty retains a special role in empirical argumentation.
The most recent in a series of empirically driven arguments on capital pun-
ishment came in Glossip v. Gross.  Justice Breyer emphasized that the death
penalty has “increasingly become unusual,” having “declined rapidly” in the
last fifteen years.  In a dissent from denial of certiorari issued late in 2016,
177 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772–73 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178 See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 58, 81 (Conn. 2015) (noting that some counties
have rarely or almost never imposed the death penalty in the state and that nationally, less
than two percent of counties account for all death sentences); see also State v. Peeler, 140
A.3d 811, 811 (Conn. 2016) (per curiam) (finding ruling retroactive).
179 State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018) (describing findings of statistical
study, finding significant county-level variation in death sentences, as well as strong race-
based variations).
180 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054 (2018)
(No. 17-251).
181 Hidalgo, 138 S. Ct. 1054.
182 See Garrett et al., supra note 11 (reporting the results of statistical analysis of data on
all death sentencing by county from 1990 to 2016).
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Justice Breyer reiterated an argument that the death penalty has become
unconstitutional on the basis of its application in isolated and geographically
disparate counties.183  Justice Sotomayor also made reference to the con-
cerns of arbitrariness under the Eighth Amendment raised in Glossip, stating
that, “[w]hether our system of capital punishment is inconsistent with the
Eighth Amendment, as these critics have charged, is not at issue here,” but
adding that “I do believe, however, that whatever flaws do exist in our system
can be tolerated only by remaining faithful to our Constitution’s procedural
safeguards.”184
A continued focus on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a struc-
tural right that must be understood to require resources at the systemic level,
and not just considered with respect to prejudice at individual trials, provides
another important place to start.  The issue might not be whether capital
punishment is unusual, arbitrary, or cruel.  Instead, perhaps if states are
unwilling to invest in fair capital defense structures, their authority to impose
this ultimate sanction should be questioned.  There are drawbacks to a Sixth
Amendment–focused approach.  For one, instances of botched and pro-
longed executions attach themselves to the Eighth Amendment’s cruelty
prong.  For another, judges are positioned to oversee state and nationwide
trends in sentencing patterns across counties, which reveal concerns of “arbi-
trariness” that are relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis.  But perhaps
for too long, the judiciary has remained insufficiently attentive to the Sixth
Amendment problem: a fundamental failure by many states to provide effec-
tive trial level defense from a capital defender’s office.
CONCLUSION
In order to understand how and why use of the death penalty has
declined by more than two-thirds, far faster than national polling and crime
trends would predict, this Article models capital sentencing in linear and
panel models using coded state legislative data to study the enactment of life
without parole statutes, the requirement of a jury determination at the final
sentencing phase, and establishment of state systems of capital representa-
183 Sireci v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 470 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) (“The number of yearly executions has fallen from its peak of 98 in 1999 to 19 so far
this year, while the average period of imprisonment between death sentence and execu-
tion has risen from 12 years to over 18 years in that same period.” (citing DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/FactSheet.pdf; SNELL, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10; Execution List 2016, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2016 (last visited Nov.
3, 2018))).
184 Elmore v. Holbrook, 137 S. Ct. 3, 10–11 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“Many observers, on and off this Court, have questioned the reliabil-
ity and fairness of the imposition of capital punishment in America.” (citing Glossip v.
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); BALDUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 4;
William A. Fletcher, Our Broken Death Penalty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2014))).
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tion.  We found that legal changes did not matter nearly as much as
improved defense resources.  After showing that the decline in sentencing
exceeds the explanatory capacity of reduced homicide rates or totals, empiri-
cal modeling is presented to argue that state provision of capital defense is
the measure most strongly and robustly correlated with a decline in actual
death sentences.  LWOP enactments are also inconsistently associated with
reduced sentencing, and, where significant, the coefficient associated with
their impact is between fifty percent and seventy percent smaller than effects
associated with capital defense reform.  Mandating a jury determination on
the presence of an aggravating factor has no clear or consistent effect on
capital sentencing.  The defense-lawyering effect, in contrast, was robust and
consistently strong across models.
The empirical findings have implications for judges, capital litigators
and state policymakers.  First, the conclusions support the view that the mod-
ern death penalty implicates arbitrariness concerns under the Eighth
Amendment.  These data highlight that death sentencing occurs today not in
places with more homicides, but rather in places with comparatively less
resourced defense lawyers.  Second, the emphasis on capital defense directly
suggests focus on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in capital trial, and
urges that the effective tactics developed by specialized capital defenders
should be employed more widely.  States that seek to improve the fairness of
capital trials should focus on creating cost-effective offices to handle the
function.  Dramatic gains in the fair and effective administration of capital
punishment are possible by way of capital defense reform in holdout states
like Alabama, California, and Florida.  We also note that there are cost-effec-
tive and practical ways to create statewide consistency in defense short of cre-
ating entire offices, including by pooling resources among local defense
offices.
The death penalty is in a state of decline, with death sentencing in 2016
and 2017 declining to record lows.  We can credit the provision of meaning-
ful resources for capital defenders as playing an important role in this
national trend: a defense-lawyering effect.  We can also point to the deep
need to improve resources for indigent defense in this country, as policymak-
ers across the country continue to rethink our approach to incarceration and
criminal justice.  In capital cases, unless courts turn toward the structural
demands of effective defense lawyering, rather than examine ineffective assis-
tance claims in the one-off setting of postconviction challenges to individual
trials, states may continue to deny resources needed to effectively represent
people facing the death penalty.  If so, our results show how the uneven qual-
ity of defense resources raises both deep constitutional and policy concerns
about the state of the American death penalty.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 3:  JUDGE VERSUS JURY CAPITAL SENTENCING, BY STATE, 1979–2015185
State Final Authority on Capital Sentencing, by Legislation 
Alabama Judge: 1979–2015 
Alaska 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Arizona Judge: 1979–2002 Jury: 2003–2015 
Arkansas Jury: 1979–2015 
California Jury: 1979–2015 
Colorado Jury: 1979–2015 Judge: 1995–2003 Jury: 2004–2015 
Connecticut Jury: 1979–2014 
No Death Penalty: 
2015 
Delaware Jury: 1979–1990 Judge: 1991–2002 Jury: 2003–2015 
District of 
Columbia 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Florida Judge: 1979–2015 Jury: 2016 
Georgia Jury: 1979–2015 
Hawaii 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Idaho Judge: 1979–2002 Jury: 2003–2015 
Illinois Jury: 1979–2011 
No Death Penalty: 
2012–2015 
Indiana Judge: 1979–2001 Jury: 2002–2015 
Iowa 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Kansas 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–1993 Jury: 1994–2015 
Kentucky Jury: 1979–2015 
Louisiana Jury: 1979–2015 
Maine 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Maryland Jury: 1979–2012 
No Death Penalty: 
2015 
Massachusetts 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–1981 Jury: 1982–1984 
No Death Penalty: 
1985–2015 
Michigan 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Minnesota 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
185 Data used in this Article is made available in spreadsheet format at https://
virginia.box.com/s/mdcaw4llq4ctgs1ywaqr7vqsqkfwvpg8.
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State Final Authority on Capital Sentencing, by Legislation 
Mississippi Jury: 1979–2015 
Missouri Judge: 1979–2002 Jury: 2003–2015 
Montana Judge: 1979–2015 
Nebraska Judge: 1979–2014 
No Death Penalty: 
2015 
Nevada Judge: 1979–2002 Jury: 2003–2015 
New Hampshire Jury: 1979–2015 
New Jersey Jury: 1979–2006 
No Death Penalty: 
2007–2015 
New Mexico Jury: 1979–2009 
No Death Penalty: 
2010–2015 
New York 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–1995 Jury: 1996–2003 
No Death Penalty: 
2004–2015 
North Carolina Jury: 1979–2015 
North Dakota 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Ohio Jury: 1979–2015 
Oklahoma Jury: 1979–2015 
Oregon Judge: 1979–1981 
No Death Penalty: 
1982–1983 Jury: 1984–2015 
Pennsylvania Jury: 1979–2015 
Rhode Island 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
South Carolina Jury: 1979–2015 
South Dakota Jury: 1979–2015 
Tennessee Jury: 1979–2015 
Texas Jury: 1979–2015 
Utah Jury: 1979–2015 
Vermont 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Virginia Jury: 1979–2015 
Washington Judge: 1979–1980 Jury: 1981–2015 
West Virginia 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Wisconsin 
No Death Penalty: 
1979–2015 
Wyoming Jury: 1979–2015 
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TABLE 4:  YEAR OF LWOP ENACTMENT, BY STATE, 1979–2015
* Denotes state that has abolished the death penalty.
State Year
186
Year Jurors Instructed on LWOP Alternative 
Alabama 1981 1981
187
 
Alaska* 
No 
LWOP  
Arizona 1993 No general requirement of instruction
188
 
Arkansas 1976 1980
189
 
California 1976 1977
190
 
Colorado 2002 2002
191
 
Connecticut 1985 1985
192
 
Delaware 2003 2003
193
 
District of Columbia* 1981  
Florida 1994 1994
194
 
186 See Year That States Adopted Life Without Parole (LWOP) Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-states-adopted-life-with-
out-parole-lwop-sentencing (providing a national summary of statute adoption referenced
throughout Appendix A).
187 See Sample Form 39, Forms of Verdict, ALA. JUD. SYS., http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/
library/rules/crsam39.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2018); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (2018).
188 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703,-751, -752 (2018) (jury decides first whether
or not death is appropriate; if jury decides death is not appropriate, “the court shall deter-
mine whether to impose a sentence of life or natural life”).
189 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (2018); see also; Anderson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 592, 608
(Ark. 2003) (explaining the nature of Jury Forms 1–4; Form 4 states “the jury’s sentence of
death or life without the possibility of parole”); Willett v. State, 911 S.W.2d 937, 944–45
(Ark. 1995); 1 ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2d 1008 (LexisNexis 2018).
190 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 8.84, (West 2018); id. § 8.88
(standard jury instructions give choice between death and life without possibility of
parole); see also People v. Bunyard, 756 P.2d 795, 833 (Cal. 1988) (overturning death sen-
tence because the jury was instructed on the governor’s power to commute a “life without
possibility of parole” sentence; commutation instruction held too prejudicial); People v.
Green, 609 P.2d 468, 504–05 (Cal. 1980) (recounting legislative change to death penalty
statutes and referencing new scheme of death or life without parole decision for jury).
191 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b) (2018) (“The jury shall be instructed that
life imprisonment means imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.”).
192 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g) (2018) (including the language “life imprison-
ment without the possibility of release”).
193 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2018) (making first-degree murder punishable
by “imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life without benefit of proba-
tion or parole or any other reduction”).  Delaware provided judicial authority to impose
life without parole at the penalty phase of capital trial until 2016. See Rauf v. State, 145
A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam).
194 See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(a) (2018) (“[S]uch person shall be punished by life
imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.”).
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Georgia 1993 1993
195
 
Hawaii* 1976  
Idaho 2004 2004
196
 
Illinois* 1978 No general requirement of instruction
197
 
Indiana 1994 1994
198
 
Iowa* 1997  
Kansas 2004 No general requirement of instruction
199
 
Kentucky 1998 1998
200
 
Louisiana 1988 1988
201
 
Maine* 1841  
Maryland* 1987 1990
202
 
195 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (2018) (providing that jury may choose LWOP or life
with option of parole, and may be instructed on the definition of each); see also id. § 17-10-
16 (identifying May 1, 1993 as earliest date of conviction eligible for life without parole).
196 See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(7) (2018) (“The jury shall be informed as follows . . .
defendant will be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole . . . .”); see also id. § 18-4003 (degrees of murder); id. § 18-4004 (2018) (punishment
for murder); id. § 19-2515 (sentence in capital cases).
197 See, e.g., People v. Bannister, 902 N.E.2d 571, 587–88 (Ill. 2008) (holding defendant
not entitled to jury instruction at penalty phase of capital murder trial, and that a noncapi-
tal penalty would result in a “de facto natural life” term of imprisonment based on defen-
dant’s age); People v. Simms, 572 N.E.2d 947, 957 (Ill. 1991) (holding trial court acted
properly in instructing jury that it would impose sentence other than death, without
instructing jury specifically of possible terms of imprisonment, despite defendant’s claim
that, without that additional information, jury could believe that defendant would be
released in only a few years if it did not impose death penalty).
198 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (West 2018) (“The court shall instruct the jury
concerning . . . the potential for consecutive or concurrent sentencing, and the availability
of educational credit, good time credit, and clemency.”).
199 See State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 270 (Kan. 2001) (“In the absence of a request, the
trial court has no duty to inform the jury in a capital murder case of the term of imprison-
ment to which a defendant would be sentenced if death were not imposed.  Where such an
instruction is requested, the trial court must provide the jury with the alternative number
of years that a defendant would be required to serve in prison if not sentenced to death.”),
overruled on other grounds by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006).
200 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.030(4) (West 2018) (“The instructions shall state, sub-
ject to the aggravating and mitigating limitations and requirements of KRS 532.025, that
the jury may recommend upon a conviction for a capital offense a sentence of death, or at
a term of imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole . . . .”).
201 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (2018); see also id. art. 905.7 (“The form of
jury determination shall be as follows: . . . The jury unanimously determines that the defen-
dant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or
suspension of sentence.”).
202 See Bruce v. State, 569 A.2d 1254, 1268–69 (Md. 1990) (holding jury must be
instructed on the exact meaning of life without parole sentence).
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Massachusetts* 1955 No general requirement of instruction
203
 
Michigan* 1953  
Minnesota* 1992  
Mississippi 1880 1994
204
 
Missouri 1984 2001
205
 
Montana 1995 1995
206
 
Nebraska* 2002 2002–2011
207
 
Nevada 1967 1985
208
 
New Hampshire 1974 1974
209
 
New Jersey* 1995 2000
210
 
New Mexico* 2009   
203 See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 364 N.E.2d 1264, 1271 (Mass. 1977).
204 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2018); Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 793
(Miss. 2006) (“The Legislature determined that a person convicted of capital murder
whose trial begins after July 1, 1994, shall receive sentencing instructions that include the
option of life without parole.”).
205 See MO. REV. STAT ANN. § 565.030.4 (2018) (“If the trier is a jury it shall be
instructed before the case is submitted that if it is unable to decide or agree upon the
punishment the court shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment with-
out eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor or death.”).
206 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-219(2) (West 2017) (“[A]n offender sentenced under
subsection (1): shall serve the entire sentence; shall serve the sentence in prison; may not
for any reason, except a medical reason, be transferred for any length of time to another
type of institution, facility, or program; may not be paroled; and may not be given time off
for good behavior or otherwise be given an early release for any reason.”).
207 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2204 (West 2018); see also 2011 Neb. Laws 12 (remov-
ing “without parole” language).  In 2011, Nebraska changed its statutory nomenclature
from “life imprisonment without parole,” to “life imprisonment,” while retaining parole
eligibility guidelines that left no possibility of parole for inmates so sentenced. See NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-1,110 (West 2018); see also Poindexter v. Houston, 750 N.W.2d 688,
693 (Neb. 2008) (“[Defendant] is eligible for parole under the current statute once he has
served one-half his life sentence.  Because the sentence is indefinite, it is impossible to
determine when [defendant] will have served one-half his life sentence.  We conclude that
under § 83-1,110 (Cum.Supp.2006), [defendant] is not eligible for parole until the Board
of Pardons commutes his life sentence to a term of years.”).
208 See Petrocelli v. State, 692 P.2d 503, 511 (Nev. 1985) (“[T]he following instruction,
and none other, may be given: . . . Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
means exactly what it says, that the Defendant shall not be eligible for parole.”).
209 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2018); see also id. § 651-A:7 (identifying April 15,
1974, as earliest date of conviction eligible for life without parole).
210 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2018).
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New York* 1995 1995
211
 
North Carolina 1994 1994
212
 
North Dakota* 1997  
Ohio 1995 1995
213
 
Oklahoma 1987 1987
214
 
Oregon 1989 1989
215
 
Pennsylvania 1941 No general requirement of instruction
216
 
Rhode Island* 1979  
South Carolina 1995 2002
217
 
South Dakota 1978 1978
218
 
Tennessee 1995 1995
219
 
Texas 2005 2005
220
 
Utah 1992 1992
221
 
Vermont* 1987  
Virginia 1994 1999
222
 
Washington 1981 1981
223
 
211 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2018). But see, e.g., People v. LaValle,
817 N.E.2d 341, 359 (N.Y. 2004); People v. Harris, 677 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998) (invalidating separate jury instructions regarding interaction of deadlock provisions
with eventual possibility of parole).
212 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002 (2018) (“The judge shall instruct the jury, in words
substantially equivalent to those of this section, that a sentence of life imprisonment means
a sentence of life without parole.”).
213 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West 2018).
214 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 2018); Martinez v. State, 904 P.2d 138,
142 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (holding failure to instruct on meaning of life without parole
reversible error).
215 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150 (West 2018); State v. McDonnell, 987 P.2d 486,
488, 495–96 (Or. 1999) (holding failure to deliver “true life” instruction reversible error).
216 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2018); see also Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 716
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding where future dangerousness put at issue, life without parole
instruction must be given; if not, jury does not have to be informed that a “life sentence”
means life without parole).
217 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2018); State v. Shafer, 573 S.E.2d 796, 801 (S.C. 2002)
(“[W]hen requested by the state or the defendant, the judge must charge the jury in his
instructions that life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant without the
possibility of parole.”).
218 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-15-4 (2018).
219 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(e)(2) (2018).
220 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2017).
221 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(5) (West 2018).
222 See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999).
223 See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2018).
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West Virginia* 1965  
Wisconsin* 1994  
Wyoming 1996 No general requirement of instruction
224
 
TABLE 5:  CAPITAL TRIAL REPRESENTATION AND FUNDING,
BY STATE, 1979–2015
State 
Transition 
Year(s) 
State-level 
Capital 
Defense 
Notes 
Alabama 
 
No 
County appointment system: $70 hourly 
rate.
225
 
Arizona 2001* Limited 
Pooled funding contributed by counties on 
voluntary participation basis.
226
 
Arkansas 1993 Full 
Arkansas Public Defender Commission 
handles capital defense.  Reports of 
continuous resource shortfalls are noted in 
budgetary analysis.
227
 
California 1990, 2003 No 
Since 1990, county defense at a trial level has 
been supported with training by the Office of 
the State Public Defender (an entity 
primarily focused on capital appeals and 
habeas petitions).
228
  The legislature has also 
passed guidelines for trial-level 
representation.
229
 
Colorado 1963 Yes 
Colorado State Public Defender provides 
representation in all capital cases in 
Colorado.
230
 
Connecticut 1978 Yes 
Connecticut Division, State Public Defender 
Capital Defense and Trial Services Unit 
provides capital defense.
231
 
224 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2018); Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536 (Wyo. 2003) (hold-
ing jury will receive LWOP instruction if future dangerousness at issue; if the prosecution
introduces statement regarding clemency, jury must be informed that under Wyoming law,
life without parole sentences are ineligible for clemency).
225 See Katherine Sayre, Indigent Defense: Alabama Expects to Save Millions in Payments to
Lawyers, ADVANCE LOCAL (May 29, 2012, 6:48 AM), http://blog.al.com/live/2012/05/indi-
gent_defense_alabama_expec.html (reporting creation of a statewide oversight group and
an increase from the previous $65/$45 hourly rate for county-appointed representation).
226 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-588 (2018).
227 See ARK. PUB. DEF. COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF BUDGET REQUEST 538 (2016), http://
www.dfa.arkansas.gov/offices/budget/budgetRequests/0324_public_defender.pdf.
228 See About Us, supra note 22.
229 See CAL. R. CT. 4.117 (adopted effective January 1, 2003).  For a description of ongo-
ing shortfalls in county public defender funding, including in capital cases, see, for exam-
ple, Laurence A. Benner, The California Public Defender: Its Origins, Evolution and Decline, 5
CAL. LEGAL HIST. 173 (2010).
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State Transition Year(s) 
State-level 
Capital 
Defense 
Notes 
Delaware 1964*, 
2009 
Yes 
Office of Defense Services of Delaware 
represents capital defendants.  Homicide 
Unit specializing in capital cases formed in 
2009.
232
 
Florida 1974**, 2006** No 
County public defenders provide capital 
defense, with some partial state funding.
233
 
Georgia 
2003*, 
2005 Yes 
Georgia Public Defender Council provides 
capital defense for Georgia.
234
 
Idaho 1998* Limited 
Capital Crimes Defense Fund funded by 
voluntary county participation.  Multiple 
counties report underfunding.
235
 
Illinois 
1999**, 
2002* Limited 
Capital Litigation Trust Fund assists both 
prosecution and defense in capital cases.
236
 
Indiana 1989* Limited 
Indiana Public Defender Commission 
determines standards for appointment and 
compensation of counsel in capital cases.
237
 
Kansas 1995 Yes 
State Board of Indigents’ Defense Services 
provides defense in capital cases.
238
 
Kentucky 1972 Yes 
Department of Public Advocacy defends in 
capital cases or advises and funds county-
contracted attorneys.
239
 
230 See History of the Office of the State Public Defender, OFF. COLO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER,
http://www.coloradodefenders.us/information/history-of-the-office-of-the-state-public-
defender-2/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
231 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-291 (2018); Gideon’s Legacy in Connecticut: Public Defender
Offices and Specialized Units, DIVISION PUB. DEFENDER SERVS., http://www.ct.gov/ocpd/cwp/
view.asp?a=4087&q=479200 (last updated Dec. 13, 2018).
232 See Our Services, OFF. DEF. SERVS., https://ods.delaware.gov/our-services/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2018).
233 See SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 5–6.
234 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-1 (2018).
235 See IDAHO ASS’N OF CTYS., CAPITAL CRIMES DEFENSE FUND: POLICY AND PROCEDURE
MANUAL (2017), http://idcounties.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CCDF-Manual.pdf;
see also Idaho Counties Struggle with Costs of Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/921 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
236 See Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the Ryan Commu-
tations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1321–22 (2010).
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State Transition Year(s) 
State-level 
Capital 
Defense 
Notes 
Louisiana 2002*, 2009 Yes 
Louisiana Public Defender Board Guidelines 
for Public Defense require state guidelines 
for representation in capital cases.  Separate 
offices provide dedicated conflict counsel 
and representation for New Orleans capital 
cases.
240
 
Maryland 1988 Yes 
Office of the Public Defender Capital 
Defense Division (now Aggravated Homicide 
Division) handles capital defense.
241
 
Mississippi 2000* Limited 
Office of Capital Defense Counsel handles a 
small number of capital cases, as well as 
training services.
242
 
Missouri 1989 Yes 
State Public Defender System handles all 
capital cases.
243
 
Montana 
 
No 
County appointment system, with some state 
training resources provided.
244
 
Nebraska 1995* Limited 
Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy 
handles a small number of capital cases.
245
 
Nevada 1991* Limited 
Clark and Washoe Counties have 
independent public defender offices 
handling capital defense.  Other counties 
subject to state oversight.
246
 
240 IND. PUB. DEF. COUNCIL, DEATH PENALTY FACTS (2015), http://www.in.gov/ipdc/
public/dp_links/indianadpfactsheet.pdf.
241 Death Penalty Defense Unit (Capital Defense Coordinator): History of the Death Penalty
Defense Unit, KAN. ST. BOARD INDIGENTS’ DEF. SERVS., http://www.sbids.org/au_dp.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
242 See Who We Are, KY. DEP’T PUB. ADVOC., https://dpa.ky.gov/who_we_are/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
243 See LPDB Guidelines for Capital Defense, LA. PUB. DEFENDER BOARD, http://
lpdb.la.gov/Supporting%20Practitioners/Capital%20Defense/
LPDB%20Guidelines%20for%20Capital%20Defense.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).  The
Capital Conflicts Office previously handled most representation.
244 See Office of Public Defender: Origin & Functions, MD. MANUAL ON-LINE, http://
msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/61pubdf.html (last updated Mar. 16,
2018).
245 See History, MISS. OFF. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.ospd.ms.gov/CapDef.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2016); see also SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 9.
246 See Capital Litigation, MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, https://publicdefender.mo.gov/legal-
divisions/capital-litigation/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
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State Transition Year(s) 
State-level 
Capital 
Defense 
Notes 
New 
Hampshire 1980 Yes 
New Hampshire Public Defender handles 
capital cases.
247
 
New Jersey 1968* Limited 
New Jersey Office of Public Defender 
handled some capital cases and provided 
some training.
248
 
New Mexico 1973*, 2012 Yes 
Law Offices of Public Defender handle 
capital defense.
249
 
New York 1995 Yes 
Capital Defender Office provided training, 
screening and appointment system, and 
mandated $100 hourly rate.
250
 
North 
Carolina 2001 Yes 
Office of Indigent Defense Services provides 
capital defense and training for some county-
appointed attorneys.
251
 
Ohio 1976*, 2015* Limited 
Office of the Public Defender handles some 
capital defense.  Commission on 
Appointment of Counsel in Capital Cases 
provides additional training and funding.
252
 
Oklahoma 1991* Limited 
Tulsa and Oklahoma Counties have 
independent public defender offices 
handling capital cases.
253
 
Oregon 1976* Limited 
Office of Public Defense Services provides 
funding and training for county-appointed 
attorneys.
254
 
Pennsylvania 
 
No 
Compensation rates for court-appointed 
attorneys are determined by local judges, 
resulting in varying levels of funding.
255
 
247 See Tristan Scott, $1 Million Set Aside for Public Defenders Office to Handle Death Penalty
Cases, MISSOULIAN (June 5, 2011), http://missoulian.com/news/local/million-set-aside-for-
public-defenders-office-to-handle-death/article_aa96eaf2-8f29-11e0-b818-001cc4c002e0.
html (“The Office of the State Public Defender has not had a capital case go to trial since
its formation . . . .”).
248 See Background, NEB. COMM’N ON PUB. ADVOC., http://www.ncpa.ne.gov/ (last visited
Jan. 16, 2016).
249 See NEV. SUP. CT. R. 250.
250 See About Us, N.H. PUB. DEFENDER, https://www.nhpd.org/about-us/ (last visited
Dec. 26 2018).
251 See SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 3–4; see also Joseph E. Krakora, N.J. OFF. PUB.
DEFENDER, http://www.state.nj.us/defender/structure/management/joseph_krakora.
shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (“As Director of Capital Litigation, Mr. Krakora handled
numerous death penalty cases until the abolition of the death penalty in December
2007.”).
252 See Welcome, LAW OFFS. PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.lopdnm.us/index.php (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2016).
253 See History, supra note 152; see also SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 6.
254 See The IDS Commission and IDS Office, N.C. CT. SYS.: OFF. INDIGENT DEF. SERVS.,
http://www.ncids.org/IDS%20Office/What_Is_IDS.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
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State Transition Year(s) 
State-level 
Capital 
Defense 
Notes 
South 
Carolina 2008 Yes 
South Carolina Commission on Indigent 
Defense, Division of Capital Defenders 
handles capital defense.
256
 
South 
Dakota  
No 
Capital defense provided by county-
appointed attorneys: $78 hourly rate.
257
 
Tennessee 1997 Yes 
Shelby and Davidson Counties have 
independent public defender offices 
handling capital cases.  All postconviction 
defense provided by state.
258
 
Texas 2001* Limited 
Task Force on Indigent Defense sets training 
and appointment guidelines.  Regional 
Public Defender’s Office represents capital 
defendants in participating counties.
259
 
Utah 
 
No 
County Public Defender offices have limited 
ability to pull from communal funding 
pools.
260
 
Virginia 2004 Yes 
Four state-supervised regional public 
defender offices handle capital defense.
261
 
Washington 
 
No 
Capital defense handled by county-appointed 
attorneys.
262
 
Wyoming 1978 Yes 
State Office of the Public Defender handles 
capital defense.
263
 
Note: States that outlawed the death penalty prior to 2006 are omitted.
* Legislative action yielded only limited state-level capital defense.
** Legislative action did not contribute to providing state-level capital defense.
255 See Commission on Appointment of Counsel in Capital Cases, SUP. CT. OHIO & OHIO JUD.
SYS., https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/capitalCases/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2016).
256 See SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 12.
257 See id. at 5, 8.
258 See id. at 8; see also 234 PA. CODE § 801 (2018).
259 See Capital Trial Division, S.C. COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEF., https://
www.sccid.sc.gov/about-us/capital-defenders (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
260 See SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 6.
261 See About, TENN. OFF. POST-CONVICTION DEFENDER, http://tnpcdo.net/about/ (last
visited Jan. 16, 2016).
262 See Mission Statement, REGIONAL PUB. DEFENDER’S OFF., http://rpdo.org/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018); see also SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 11.
263 See Without Sufficient Funds, States are Failing to Provide Adequate Representation, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.dpic.ngo/node/74 (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
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APPENDIX B
Homicide data used in this Article is developed primarily from the CDC
WONDER database and supplemented by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report-
ing Program.  The FBI data, based on voluntary reporting by law enforce-
ment, is shown to contain 80.2% of the murders reported by the CDC.  This
figure is slightly lower than the 85%–90% published by the Bureau of Justice
and Statistics.264  It is important to establish any forms of systemic bias that
may impact the study.  Comparison of the databases indicates no apparent
temporal bias in underreporting of the homicides by the UCR database.265
Close scrutiny suggests minimal impact of geographic biases upon analysis of
death sentencing.  The states in which the UCR records most closely match
WONDER data include many important states in the context of capital pun-
ishment: California, Nevada, Arizona, Maryland, and Washington.  Dispari-
ties are more pronounced in some regions, but most states requiring
supplemental FBI data have opted to abolish the death penalty.  Since WON-
DER data is available in large states throughout the time period studies, geo-
graphical disparities are especially unlikely to impact analysis.
FIGURE 7:  CDC WONDER AND FBI UCR HOMICIDE DATA, 1985–2012,
BY DATA SOURCE
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264 See SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 113, at 7.
265 See id. at 8; see also Death Penalty Representation, supra note 148.
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APPENDIX C
TABLE 6:  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF STATE DEATH SENTENCING AND
HOMICIDES, ONE-YEAR LAG, 1979–2015
 Ordinary 
least squares 
(linear) 
regression 
Panel model 
controlling for 
fixed effects 
within states 
“Mixed effects” 
model 
controlling for 
both fixed and 
random effects 
Poisson 
regression 
model 
 
Note:  * Indicates significance at 0.1 level.  
 ** Indicates significance at 0.001 level. 
No state-level 
capital 
defense 
provided 
3.48* 
(1.76) 
4.297** 
(0.48) 
4.270** 
(0.46) 
1.165** 
(0.04) 
Life without 
parole 
sentencing 
unavailable 
1.520 
(2.22) 
1.374** 
(0.32) 
1.334* 
(0.31) 
0.223** 
(0.02) 
Judge 
authority in 
final 
sentencing 
phase 
3.800* 
(1.71) 
0.594 
(0.53) 
0.820 
(0.50) 
0.361** 
(0.03) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7:  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF STATE DEATH SENTENCING AND
HOMICIDES, TWO-YEAR LAG, 1979–2015
 Ordinary 
least squares 
(linear) 
regression 
Panel model 
controlling for 
fixed effects 
within states 
“Mixed effects” 
model 
controlling for 
both fixed and 
random effects 
Poisson 
regression 
model 
 
Note:  * Indicates significance at 0.1 level.  
 ** Indicates significance at 0.001 level. 
No state-level 
capital 
defense 
provided 
3.746* 
(1.82) 
4.201** 
(0.47) 
4.186** 
(0.45) 
1.155** 
(0.04) 
Life without 
parole 
sentencing 
unavailable 
1.650 
(2.29) 
1.363** 
(0.31) 
1.354* 
(0.30) 
0.228* 
(0.02) 
Judge 
authority in 
final 
sentencing 
phase 
3.027* 
(1.77) 
0.660 
(0.52) 
0.872 
(0.50) 
0.372** 
(0.03) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 8:  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF STATE DEATH SENTENCING AND HOMICIDE
TOTALS, 1979–2015, WITH 1991–2015 RESENTENCES REMOVED IN
YEARS OF LWOP JURY INSTRUCTIONS
 Ordinary 
least 
squares 
(linear) 
regression
Panel model 
controlling 
for fixed 
effects 
within states
“Mixed 
effects” 
model 
controlling 
for both 
fixed and 
random 
effects 
Poisson 
regression 
model 
Negative 
binomial 
model 
 
Note:  * Indicates significance at 0.1 level.  
 ** Indicates significance at 0.001 level. 
No state-
level capital 
defense 
provided 
3.273* 
(1.69) 
3.999** 
(0.48) 
4.012** 
(0.46) 
1.102** 
(0.04) 
0.999** 
(0.08) 
Jury not 
fully 
informed of 
life without 
parole 
sentencing 
0.893 
(1.67) 
2.014** 
(0.32) 
1.914** 
(0.31) 
0.333** 
(0.03) 
0.160* 
(0.06) 
Judge 
authority in 
final 
sentencing 
phase 
3.004* 
(1.63) 
0.418 
(0.53) 
0.691* 
(0.50) 
0.389** 
(0.03) 
0.333** 
(0.07) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 9:  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF STATE DEATH SENTENCING AND ONE-YEAR
LAGGED HOMICIDE RATES, 1979–2015
 Ordinary 
least squares 
(linear) 
regression 
Panel model 
controlling for 
fixed effects 
within states 
“Mixed effects” 
model 
controlling for 
both fixed and 
random effects 
Poisson 
regression 
model 
 
Note:  * Indicates significance at 0.1 level.  
 ** Indicates significance at 0.001 level. 
No state-level 
capital 
defense 
provided 
6.502* 
(2.90) 
3.037** 
(0.49) 
3.151** 
(0.49) 
1.461** 
(0.04) 
Life without 
parole 
sentencing 
unavailable 
-0.332 
(3.72) 
0.608* 
(0.33) 
0.557* 
(0.32) 
-0.065* 
(0.02) 
Judge 
authority in 
final 
sentencing 
phase 
0.767 
(2.85) 
0.078 
(0.53) 
0.125 
(0.52) 
0.096** 
(0.03) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
TABLE 10:  COMPARISON OF POISSON AND NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION
ANALYSIS OF STATE DEATH SENTENCING AND HOMICIDE RATES,
1979–2015
 Poisson regression 
model 
Negative binomial 
model 
 
Note:  * Indicates significance at 0.1 level.  
 ** Indicates significance at 0.001 level. 
No state-level capital defense 
provided 
1.181** 
(0.04) 
1.046** 
(0.08) 
Life without parole sentencing 
unavailable 
0.218** 
(0.02) 
0.030 
(0.07) 
Judge authority in final 
sentencing phase 
0.349** 
(0.03) 
0.323** 
(0.08) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
